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INTRODUCTION

Public policy, that necessary consequence of the
Leviathan,
to fear.

is the end product of a power holder's reaction
Man likes to view himself as a rational being

endowed with the ability to govern his own life as he chooses.
Yet, roan's actions are not to be found originating within
his mental consciousness in an example of spontaneous com
bustion.
tions.

Man's action© are more properly defined as reac
There roust be an outside stimulus to motivate the

human creature into taking positive or negative steps.

The

outside stimulus must be, either consciously or subconsciously,
recognized by man as affecting him personally; and the
knowledge of its doing so gives him an unpleasant sense of
insecurity--of fear.

Through inborn and ©xperientially

dictated response© which are Individualistic in nature, man
react© to remove the fear and return to a state of mental
tranquility.

Man's acts are truly rational only in so far

as they are a natural consequence of hi© need for security.
Popular conception© to the contrary, man doe© not feel secure
if he is placed in a position where he is called upon to
govern his own life.

His very nature cause© him to seek

out and to allow other© to stand over him.

There have been

those who have met man's need to be governed and have gathered
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to "themselves the power "to direct the composite msn— the
polity.

It is to these holders of power that the ability

to make public policy has Fallen.

Yet* these men cannot

remove from themselves their own humanness.

They, too,

must have an outside stimulus to cause them to act.

They,

too* are motivated by fear and it© reflection is found in
the actions they undertake.

fubllc policy, then, is a

minority’s reaction to fear.
To support the part of the hypothesis concerning
power to form public policy being held in but a few hands,
a review of elitist theory concerning the presence of a
few such power holders in every organization and elitist
interpretations of why this phenomena takes place will be
given.

Their argument centers around the fact that only a

few of the broad membership have the inclination and ability
to grasp an organization*© leadership.

Further,

if suc»

oessful, the oligarchy will resist broadening the power
base and try to prevent other® from gaining similar status.
Within the oligarchy will occasionally be found one
individual who holds more power then anyone else.

He will

be recognized as the head of the organization and it is
From him that most of the group’s policies emanate.

Should

another of the oligarch© have a desire to form a policy of
his own, he may be able to succeed.

Unless the leader’s

position is rather tenuous, however, it is rare for such
an act to occur without either the aoquieeence,

ignorance,
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indifference, or support: of the organization*s head.
To add weight to the elitist conclusions, note wiil
foe made of the tendency of man to forego the chance to
govern himself and to turn instead toward a leader.

Other

theories substantiating and explaining elitist observations
as a biological consequence of man*© evolution and struggle
to survive also will foe put forth.
After looking at who makes policy, the examination
will turn to why it is made.

The basic conclusion is that

man was shaped by his desire to live.

The ability to fear

was implanted within him to aid in this endeavor.

fcfhen

men is threatened, he feels afraid and reacts to remove
the fear.

What may foe threatened is his actual physical

life, or the self he wishes to foe.

In either case, should

the power holder have reason to be afraid, he will react
with policies to alleviate his anxiety.
The remainder of the study will explore some of the
fears which motivate men’s responses.

Examples of a partic

ular fear embodied in the cause of an action then wiil foe
presented.

While what is dealt with can be applied to ©my

organization, the organizations which will foe examined through
out the investigation are nation-states.

The leader® to foe

shown initiating actions will usually foe various chief ex
ecutives of those states.

Occasionally other of the oli

garchs will foe mentioned, but it is the chief executive who
popularly is recognized a© embodying the decision-making
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process and, with the exception of those state© where there
is a differentiation between the heads of state and government, the nation itself.

For "when he is insulted, the

nation

is insulted* when he ha© a dream, the nation has a

dreamj

when he has ©n antagonist, the nation ha© an antag

onist."^*

Therein lies the importance for such a study in

that it will aid in understanding the reason© behind the
actions encompassing the entire citizenry and have an all
too real effect upon their lives*
Some clarification of what will be called public
policy

must first be made to help understand what is to

follow.

Public policy must not toe confused with governmental

action.

While they usually ere synonymous,

universal constant.

it 1© not a

Public policy is the result of a power

holder*© desires {reactions}.

He must, however, because of

the magnitude of his office, delegate the responsibility of
transferring his policies into action to others.

These

"others" have fear© of their own, however, upon which they
must act.

For them, fear of the result of not doing as

ordered may be less than the fear of doing something that is
personally repugnant to their beliefs or ©ansitivities.

They

will thus fail to implement the policies*^

*®eorg© E* Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency
{New Yorks The New American O B r a r y T I n c 1 ^ 7 l T , p. 1J28.
&

•

Reedy in Ibid., pp. 43-43'and Richard £. Neustadt in
Pres1dentlal Power (New Yorks The New American Library, Inc.,
~r19643" make"'' the point of m leader*© power being determined by
the ability of the leader to persuade those around him to do
his bidding.
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Robert; C. Tuc'ker has pointed out that a dictator has
a great deal of control over his state’s bureaucracy and he
is able to transfer his desires into action•5
as true in a democracy.

This is not

bong before the Cuban missile

crisis arose, President John P. Kennedy ordered the removal
of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

This directive

was not carried out, and it was only with the development of
the Cuban situation that Kennedy discovered the State
Department’s failure to respond.*^

Clearly public policy and

governmental action [or inaction as the case may be] were
not one and the same in this instance.
Another important facet in this regard is it may be
the power holder who desires not to act.

In a somewhat

different context, Peter Saehrach and Morton S. Baratz have
accurately stated that recognition of non-decisions is as
important as concentrating on actual decisions.5

Public

policy calling for inaction is important to consider for it
is just as much of a reaction to fear as is the policy designed
to activate positive moves.

It may also be that the power

holder’s reaction is so severe that he not only develops
policy calling for an absence of action, but that he may,

^Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism,”
World Politics, XVII [July, 1965), 555-583.
^Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days [New York?
American Library, Inc., 1969], pp. 94-95.

The New

5Peter Bachraoh and Morton S* Baratz, "Two Faces of
Power," American Political Science Review, LVI [December,
1962], 947-952.
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like an ostrich, ©tick his head in the sand and no longer
perceive the existence of a certain situation.
Considering the word fear, James C, Davie© write©
tens^on which ” is characteristically derived from a
specific need and released in some kind of activity rele*
vant to a particular need, even though the activity may
hat be functional to the *real# relief of the tension,”®
As regards."unpleasant mental tension,” Davie© categorizes
two types—••fear and anxiety,'
Fear is intense, short in duration, specific, and
is usually related to physical survival. , * • Anxiety
is chronic, relatively low level Ct;hat is, not in
tense), and vague* • • • Fear is apt to produce
a prompt reaction either to remove the object
of fear from oneself or oneself from the object of
fear. , , . Anxiety on the other hand is chronic
and vague.
It endures over a long period of time
and is Cdifficult) to locate. . . . It produces
a different kind of reaction.
One does not know
quite what is the cause for his anxiety and, part
ly for that reason,
he does not know quite what
to do •
For the purposes of this study, the terms fear and anxiety
will be used interchangeably.

If specification i© deemed

necessary to ©how the degree of fear felt, an adjective
will be used.

This is not

remembering that fear doe©

to deny the

importance of

come in various magnitudes. A

power holder1© fears do change from moment to moment and

Fi
James C. Davies, Human Nature in Folitics {New York?
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.*'1963), p. 64.
7 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
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the Fluctuating strengths or weaknesses of a particular
Fear, or between separate Fears, do have much to do with
the type of reactIon that the man has and thus the type
of policies he develops.
Where possible, the words of a power holder will
be given to support the hypothesis*

While one cannot

completely reject the words a power holder spoke before
achieving power in explaining actions after reaching the
pinnacle, more importance should be placed upon those
utterances emanating from the latter position.

Often when
a

one’s social status changes, so, too, does his personality.”
The proud man often becomes humble, servility
changes to arrogance, an honest nature learn© to
lie, or at least to dissemble, under pressure of
need, while the man who has an ingrained habit
of lying and bluffing makes himself over and puts
on an outward semblance at least of honesty and
firmness in character.
And often, as will be mentioned later, the man whose status
change© from power seeker to power holder will com© to
possess different motivating fears and thereby different
reasons for acting.
Obviously the power holder 1© not going to bare his
innermost.drives and publicly vent his fears.
he will not even realize them himaelf.

In many cases,

Thosa people that

are closest to the power holder will likewise often be in
the dark as to the true motivation of their common nuoleus,

®Gaetano Mosca, The fluling Class [New York 5
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939}, p. 53.

McGraw-

73

Therefor©, the word© of the power holder end the perc§p*
tions of his associates are actually often of little aid
in giving satisfactory insights into the true reasons behind
the formulation of a policy.

Because of thi®, policies will

often necessarily have to be focused upon rather than
words for a clearer understanding of the power holder*
Admittedly much of the following will be speculative.
There is no more complex subject in life than man.

And as

there is no surety in life* there is, therefore* none in man.
The greatest difficulty in judging him and his thoughts
and actions is that one is in truth judging oneself.

It

would require a creature from another planet to be able
to make impartial conclusions regarding man.

Yet, man has

never ©topped seeking to explain his own world*

In examining

that part of man's environment known a© politics and power,
the complexities encountered and the necessity in doing
so were put dawn.by. Machi©veili writing to his Prince:^
Men in general judge more by the eyes thrai by the
hands, for every one can see, but very few have to
feel.
Everybody sees what you appear to be, few
feel what you are, and those few will not dare to
oppose themselves to the many, who have the majority
of the state to defend them) and in the action©
of men, and especially of princes, from which there
is no appeal, the end justifies the means.

^Niccolo Machiaveili, The Prince, trans. by Luigi
Ricci [New Yor k : The American Library, Inc., 19523, P*
94 •

CHAPTER I
THE AUTHOR OF PUBLIC POLICY

The power to make public policy ie Held by a
minority of a nation*© citizenry*

Occasionally a large

bulk of decision making is centered in but one individual.
The elitist theorists, especially Gaetano Mosca, Viifredo
Pareto and Robert Michels, have recognized power*© proelivity to fall Into the hands of a minority and have focused
attention upon the tendency.

The elitist probing of the

phenomena give© some insight© into the oligarchical features
of policy formulation as a necessary consequence of organi
zation*

Erich Fromm*© observations provide some further

explanation of minority rule.
to be incompatible.

He holds ©elf rule and man

Finally, the field of biology gives fur

ther prodf that submission to leaders is a natural product
of man's evolution*
Gaetano Mosea epitomized the basic tenet© of what ha©
come to be known a© elitist theory when he stated:*
Among the constant fact© and tendencies that are to
be found in political organisms, one is so obvious that
it is apparent to the most casual eye*
In ell
societies * * * two classes of people appear— a class
that rule© and a class that ie ruled.
The first class#
alwpys the less numerous, perform© all

^Mosca, The Ruling Glass, p. SO.
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political Functions* Cand3 monopolizes power . . .
whereas the second, the more numerous class, is
directed and controlled by the first.
No matter what name is given to the type of governmental
system a state or organization possesses, a minority*-an
©lite— will be Found holding the rein© of power For that
state or organization.
ViIfredo Pareto made note of another phenomena which
added to the school of elitist thought.
the obvious presence of a ruling class.8

He, too, recognized
The additional

existence of others who wish and endeavor to become part
of the oligarchy cannot be denied*

A© Pareto notes, the

First group wishes to remain in power, but For various reasons
the elite will come to lose its vitality and those strug
gling on the outside For political status will occasionally
be allowed to join with or will overthrow and supplant the
power holders.

Pareto has thus shown that the ruling class

does not remain static.

There is instead a ’’circulation of

elites” and occasional change© in who constitutes the govern
ing oligarchy*8
Mhat is the importance of the desire to gain power

^Pareto-* s words sound quite similar to those of Mo see
He wrote s ’’The least we can do is to divide society into
two stratai
a higher stratum, which usually contains the
rulers, and a lower stratum, which usually contains the
ruled.
The Fact is so obvious that it has always Forced
itself upon the most casual observation • . •
ViIfredo
Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans* by Andrew Songiorne r;
and Arthur Livingston [New York t Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 19353, p. 1437.
3 Xbid.. p p . 1430—1533.
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by one group and the desire to maintain sole control of it by
another'?
The elitist answer:4
The whole history of civilized mankind comes down
to a conflict between the tendency of dominant elements
to monopolize political power and transmit possession
of it by inheritance, and the tendency toward a
dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of new
forces *
While the group known as power seekers doe© unques
tionably lie behind the cause for numerous public policies,
for present purposes it is necessary to remember only one
minority can be the actual holders of power at one time.
Now the question?

Why does power fall to but a'few

individuals?
The elitist conclusion comes from Robert Michels.0
His affiliation© with, and studies of, the German Socialist
party directed Him to formulate theories which help to ex
plain those previously mentioned.
ity always rules.

Michels agrees a minor

He termed the tendency for minority rule

the ” iron law of oligarchy.”

Oligarchy occur© because the

group which becomes spokesman for an organization develops
a penchant for power.

This collection of individuals realizes

the urge and out of self interest becomes consolidated and
organized to withstand any challenge© to it© preferred

^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 65.
^Robert Michels, Political t Parties, trens* by Eden
Paul and Cedar Paul CNew York? The Free Press, 1962]•

II

status.

The majority, on the other hand, i© naturally

passive and thereby allows the minority to take control.
NicheIs states the chief reason underlying the birth and
sustenance of the oligarchy, however, is the very nature of
the organisation itself.

Any group wishing to have an

impact upon its surroundings must organise to realize its
greatest possible strength.

To organize take© technical

capabilities* to keep the group functioning in unison like
wise takes ©kills.

These character1stice, along with the

desire to use them, are found in only a few, giving that
few the authority to rule.

The more expansive the group

is, the greater the need for organization.
make it more responsive and unified,
increasingly centralized.

In order to

it must become

A© the size of the group en

larges, the number of people with capabilities of directing
it, in return, diminishes.

Power is thus necessarily

grasped by Fewer and fewer hands and organization becomes
synonymous' with oligarchy.

And -lis Nichel© implied, organ

ization become© synonymous with nation-state.
Power comes to be held by an ever decreasing number.
IF,mot checked, the tendency reaches the conclusion, no
matter how the ©tat© is originally constructed, of a singular
person arising from within the oligarchy to grasp increasing
power and overshadow each of the other members of the policymaking elite*

The dominant power of this person is under

stood by at least the ruling class if not the entire
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populace.

When speaking, then, of the oligarchical features

of an organization,

it must be remembered a situation can

develop where *there is one individual who is chief among
the leaders of

the ruling class as a whole and stands • * •

at the helm of

the ©tate."^

tItalics

added).

It may foe that this singular person is not the
visible, "legal* ruler of the state.

A dominant power holder

may instead foe found behind the scenes giving, not solely
advice, but actual
believes to foe

orders to what the

the true "head" of the

situation is the exception to the rule.

overwhelming

majority

state.

such e

Vet,

Overlooking

hereditary accession to the throne, those who come to
achieve supreme status as a dominant leader of a nation or
member of the governing oligarchy do so out of desire for
that position.

Rare would foe the case where they would

knowingly relinquish their long sought for power or their
social status.

While on© man admittedly never does hold

complete power in a nation, one man occasionally doe©
gravitate to himself dominant power in the realm of making
public policy.
Evidence of other© who do advise and/or request
favorable policies from a dominant power holder is not
to foe denied.

Often they ere able to shape end sway the

thoughts and the resulting policy decisions of the man at

^MoecSf The Ruling Class, pp. SO-51.
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•the top of the power structure*

Yet, in the final analysis,

it ie for the one dominant individual end him alone to accept
or reject the advice, to act or not to act, to commit himself
to a certain policy or not to do so.

President Harry

Trumanfs desk had a sign summing up the situation*
"The Suck Stops Here.”

It said,

Where the buck stops, one will

find the man of power*
The "iron law of oligarchy" largely tends to conclude
in power for policy making falling under the domain of a
singular individual, e*g*, a Stalin, a Qe Gaulle, a Hitler, a
Lincoln, who govern© according to what the time, the place,
and his own personal characteristic© dictate.

A© the elitist

proponents would agree, "government is an act of grace, but
the ultimate sovereign is not God or the spirit of the
revolution or what not.

It is the person of the ruler."'7

Samuel H. Geer, Nicholas Wahl and Peter H. Merkl
have examined the legislative branches of Britain, France and
Germany respectively.

Each found evidence of the same trend

of power concentration in the government they viewed.
In each case there was a recognizable shift of power from

70avies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 300. Regarding
the thought "the ultimate sovereign is . . . the person of
the ruler" Charles Merriam makes an interesting point in
Political Power CNew Yorks
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1934j, p p • 51-52•
In political thought sovereignty is
theoretically not divisible. However, in the realm of
international relations, each state, large or small, is
regarded as an equal.
Each is supposedly sovereign. The
accomodation to theory satisfies the power holder's desire
to have no one above him.
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the legislature to the executive*

To become lodged in an

ever decreasing minority--in on© man--is th© natural ten
dency of” power#
However, the qualification of th© tendency reaching
its conclusion only if allowed to continue unchecked was
made*

It must be stressed, the end result of on© ruling

class* existence is one person reaching the top of the
oligarchy#

Before the conclusion is reached, an era of

competing oligarchs striving for supremacy is present.
Dominant power hangs temptingly like the forbidden fruit
waiting only to be plucked*

It doe© not hang in the sight

of but one individual, however, but in the sight of many
who are all easily tempted*

In the wild scramble to reach

the bough where th© fruit hangs, the competitors may end up
trampling each other so that no one comes to wear the
mantle of supremacy.
There are often eras found consisting of dominant
rule of the few rather than the one#

In many democracies,

executive dominance of late did not occur until after
period© of legislative supremacy.*

Yet, within th© organ

ization of the legislative branch itself, sub-oligarchies

p

Samuel H* Seer, f,The British Legislature and the
Problem of Mobilizing Consent,** Nicholas Wahl, "The French
Parliament:
From Last Word to Afterthought,” Peter H*
Merkl, **Party Government in the Bonn Republic,1* ©11 ,three
In Law Makers in © Changing World, ed* by Elke Frank
CEnglewood CiifF©7 New Jersey:
Frentice-Hali, Inc., 19661•
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of the ruling class were and are present;.

In -the Unitied

States, John C , Calhoun, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay
are recognized as being dominant policy makers of their
time and countryi

Still the policies Initiated during

their era did come From more than one source.

Perhaps

they were guilty of trampling each other.
Such infighting is surely what happened within
France’s Fourth Republic where a number of government©
quickly rose and fell;

When one sat as head of the govern*

ment, many policies emanating from his office were the
policies of members of his supporting coalition.

Should

he flout - the desires of hi© allies, their support was
gone and his government fell.

Often in the history of

the nation-state, the competition for dominance within
the elite itself exerts a strong check upon the "iron
law of oligarchy" running it© course.
Power is of a dynamic quality deploring a vacuum.
If power is not exercised,

it often is not held.

There

ha© been m propensity in the United States, too, for
policy making to drift to the executive.

However, fol

lowing th© Russian launching of Sputnik in 1957, President
Dwight 0. Eisenhower took no positive responsive measures*
The majority leader in the Senate, Lyndon 8. Johnson,
stepped into the vacuums

he held inquiries into the matter

and pushed through Congress a bill to improve America's
Hole in space exploration* providing the obvious example
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of policy being formed by someone other than the chief
executive of the nation.®

The power to make policy is

never completely held by one man.

Yet, as in this example,

when policies are made, they are th© result of one man’s
effort with the support of, and often modifioations by,
other oligarchs.
Even should there be a person holding what is
recognized as dominant power, many policies ©till will
be made by others.

Some policies will be initiated from

within hie own coterie.

Definitely Lavrenty Beria, Robert

McNamara, Heinrich Himmier, and Edwin Stanton initiated
policies on their own affecting their nations to dome
degree.

Since the head of any organization, certainly in

cluding one as vast as a nation-state, must allow some
decisions to be made independently of himself, absolute power
is never held by on© individual.

Others, both in and out

side of a dominant power holder’s group, exercise it with
the same qualification© upon their acts as is found upon
any dominant possessor of power.
Power inherently ha© limitation© on its exercise.
Even a dominant power holder must rely on other© to retain
his position and to carry out his policies.

A© the natural

tendency of the organization necessitates the situation,
power is always ©hared, and its exercise is always checked
%

^Reedy, Twilight, pp. 56-62.
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by the need not to antagonize those whose support must
be maintained*
A Further control against the rise of the dominant
power holder, is Found outside the oligarchy*

There are

those on the periphery oF the structure who are likewise
tempted to reach For power and sometimes succeed*
result is the

The

circulation oF elites,” and the ” iron lew

oF oligarchy” must start anew on the road oF concentrating
power into Fewer and Fewer hands, often without ever
having neared the ultimate destination oF dominant rule by
one man.
V
Elitist observations are often regarded with anathema
by those who regard democracy as the ideal Form oF govern
ment*

The elitist theorists will ©ay what ought to be and

what is are two diFFerent subject©*

They have written that

there is a class oF power holders in every country,
the United S t a t e s . ^

including

In response, there have been pluralist

attack© launched against such conclusions^* in an eFFort to
refute, elitism*

13

Similar maneuvers have been made

against the earlier philosopher© who Found evidence oF a

^Sees
0. Wright Mills* The Power Elite [New York;
OxFord University Press, 19563•
^ S e e : Daniel Bell, ”The Power Elite--Beconsidered,”
The American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958]*
238-350.
lSpor* some diFFering comments on elitism, s e a : Peter
Sachrach, ed*, Political Elites in a Democracy (New Yorks
Atherton Press, 1971].

xe

ruling class.*3
Many of the
deal

democratic theorists have attempted to

with what is* rather than with what ought

hold rule by the many really must and does exist#
not realize that elitism per se Is not bad*
fact#

to toe#They
They do

It is simply

Those in power may toe good or they may be toad#

Any

evaluative conclusions depend upon whet the power holders
and their observer© conceive to to© the proper rules of the
political game#
with

There are different rules for & country

a heritage of dictatorships just as there

are forones

having democracy a© a basis of their political history.

It

is, in part, the conception of rule© and the underlying
belief systems of nations which separate one from another.
Because the elitists feel power invested in a minority to toe
common to all polities, does not necessarily make elitism
and democracy incompatible doctrine©.*^
foundations,

In their separate

it must to© admitted, the former Is based more

on reality? the latter, on idealism.
One of d©mooraey,© basic tenets is the necessity of
an educated, aware* motivated, and concerned citizenry.

All
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For instance, some varying thoughts on Michel© can toe
found ins Philip J# Cook, ’’Robert Michels* Political Parties
in Perspective,n Journal of Politics, XXXIII CAugust, 197l3,
773-798, C#W# Qassineili, ’’The Iron Law of Oligarchy,.** American
Political Science Review, XLVII CSeptember, 19533, 773-784,
and John 0# May* '’Democracy, Organization, Michels,” American
Political Science Review, LlX CJune* 19853 * 417-439#
14Seei Joseph A. Schumpeter, Gap1telism, Socialism,
end Democracy (New Yorks
Harper S Brothers Fublishers, 19503,
p p * 369-389*

things, of course, are relative, but the majority of th©
citizenry doe© not possess these qualities in the same
magnitude the oligarchs do,

Regarding motivation, in

studies of a middle-size eastern city and two parishes in
Louisiana, it was discovered that politician© who held an
office viewed as having high powersand achievement potential
were more strongly power and achievement motivated then nonpolitician© who otherwise held
and occupations,*3

similar statue in the

Motivation for power?

community

It is found in

the oligarchs, not in the many.
Who ©re the

politically concerned in a state?

Goldhamer say© it is not the great mass of people*

Herbert
Most

individuals are concerned with matters other than public
policy, with only a few finding satisfaction in dealing
with it© formulation.

The majority, even when they do

become politically activated, e.g., at election time, will
center their attention on personalities and not policies.*^
The conclusions should not be interpreted a© meaning
no power is held by the greet mess of nonJpower holder©.

A©

Mosca was quick to point out, in a representative system
those oligarch© who come to bear the title of representstlve and want to retain it, must rely upon th© votes of th©

ISRufu© P. Browning and Herbert Jacob, "Power Motiva
tion and th© Political Personality,” Public Opinion Quarterly,
XXVIII [Spring, 19643, 75-90.
i&Herbert 6oldhamer, "Public Opinion and Personality,”
The American Journal of Sociology.LV [January, 19503, 346-354•
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many.

Thay will thus necessarily listen to the people’s

complaints.

In this area, the majority does have p o w e r . ^

For if those in power flatly reject the people’s entreaties
and fall completely out of step with the great mas© of
opinion in a state, the elite will be forced to change CIn
herently or via "circulation"] or face a loss of power-— from
no longer being obeyed to the more frightening possibility
of being replaced*

"Ultimately, the leader and hi© char

acteristic© represent the group itself and are not at
variance with its characteristics*"^8
In deference to the pluralist viewpoint, the people
In any state under any form of government do have impact.
Their support or ©t least acquiescence is a must for those
who would sit at the pinnacle of th© power hierarchy*
must be noted, say the pluralist©,

It

if the leadership does

not follow, or if it runs counter to, the will of the
people, th© citizenry will rise and overthrow the tyran
nical power holders.

Therefore, th© people are for all

Intents and purposes directing the nation.

Yet, for that

amorphous mass to rebel, it needs a Sorelian type of
politically motivating myth19

and an organization.

As in

l^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 155.
19Benjaroin N. Schoenfeld, "The Psychological Charac
teristics of Leadership," Social Forces.XXVI [Nay, 1948], 396.
1Q
S e e : Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.
by T *E. Hulme and J. Roth CGlencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press,
1950].
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unity there is strength* so too, recalling Michels, ther© i©
oligarchy.

Fort tshere to be a revolts, tshen, "the mas© musts

have an elite of it© own.
seeker.

There is the realm of the power

He will spring From apparently nowhere to lead.

He

will give the people the necessary belief, the necessary
motivation for rebellion.
rel out! H

He will say, "Throw the seound*»

He will mean, "Put me into power! **

The power

holder, in trying to prevent and destroy revolution

attempts

to provide the people the necessary belief, the necessary
motivation, not to revolt.

Therefore, the seekers and

holders of authority together "are able to fashion, and
within very wide limits, even to create the will of the
people.

...

So far as this is so, the will of the people

is the product and not the motive of the political process. " ^
[Italics added].
The impact of the broad spectrum of the people on
public policy is, in some sense, present.

Considerations

of the citizenry*© response to any planned move.' is often
one of the aspects of proposed policy the leadership will
try to fathom before acting.

However, just as they did with

their advisers, the leaders can ignore the majority.

The

power holder© may misjudge or fail to see the people*s
possible response to an act.

They may realize a public

policy will have an unfavorable impaot upon the public.

^ S c h u m p e t e r , Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 263*
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but; For other reason© -they will move anyway.

The ability

oF the power seeker© to use a policy to rally the people
against the government 1© another oF the considerations
sometime© taken into account by the power holders*

&hile

it may cause harm to their position later, the important
Fact to remember 1© that policies can be, and are, made
without regard of the people.

In a circuitous route, the

mss© may influence the oligarchy, but the reverse, as shown
above, is more likely to be true.

The perplexing question

needing to be answered is whether or not the people act
on their own.

It would appear that democrats would say ,fy«9a,”

the people can and do spontaneously react to a move by
the government which i© against their wishes*

From what

has been presented already, however, the answer would appear
to be ”n o T h e

mess is just that— a Formless, ununified,

©pathetic group oF Individuals who are shaped and ©purred to
attack or defend by the seekers and holder© of power*
Man may ©peek of the desirability of rule by the
many.

The philosophy give© meaning to one*© life.

However,

to a large extent, democracy is but motivating political
myth and i© but a tool of the seeker or holder of authority*
True, they possibly even believe it themselves*

But be that

a© it may, when one witnesses the action© of those before and
and after achieving their goal of power a© they stir the
masses by promising a Future utopian democracy, one sees
the truth in the adage, Mth© revolutionaries of today become

83

the reactionaries of
\ tomorrow .” 2 1

The ” iron law of oil-

garchy” continues with its metal-like invincibility and, if
unchecked, power will gravitate to an ever decreasing
number of individual®.

The people*s continual subjection

to the cycle and their willingness to sometime© help speed
it to its final product rather than hindering it can be
seen in history.

Why?
Erich Fromm, watching the rise to dominance of Adolf
Hitler, formulated interesting hypotheses to shed some
light on this mystery .3 3

Fromm felt man and democracy to be

incompatible.

in freeing man, at the same time

Democracy,

alienate© him from his environment.

Man must look only to

himself to find the answer© for the troubled world.

As

he can find no answer© within himself, he becomes lost,
powerless and afraid.

A threatening situation he must face

will grow more pressing, and his feelings of helplessness
will become magnified.

Man will try to find relief by sub

merging his fears, his freedom, hi© self in **© person, an
institution, Hod, the nation, conscience, or a psychic compulsion . " 3 3

Just as a child will turn from a threat and go

g *Miohels, Political Parties, p. 187.
33Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom CNew Yorkt
Books, 1971}.
'
'
g 3 lbid., p. 177.
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to his father for comfort, so, too, man will turn from freedom
and look to an authoritarian for respite.

The figure of

authority will calm hi® fears, answer his questions, and
give him a plaoe in the sun where he will not have to rely
on himself.

The majority of mankind does not want demooraoy.

They, as Goldhamer said, do not care to worry about policies.
They focus on who will comfort them.

It could be said they

want a leader.
Masoa, Pareto and Michel© observed what mankind wants,
mankind ha© received.

Man*© political organizations are in

deed controlled by elites.

Within each elite there occasion

ally is one man who comes to hold dominant power.
and Fromm each found reason© for the occurrence.

Michels
The obser

vations of these thinkers and other© have done much to
damage the philosophies of those expounding the virtues of
democracy.

It has been left to another group, however, to

deliver the potential coup de grace to the plurslists•

Bio-l-

bgiSt© have delivered theories and findings of their own
substantiating and clarifying the causes of the phenomena of
man and his acceptance of rulers.
With Charles Darwin and his The Origin of Species, ^
new thoughts concerning man and hi© ancestors came to the
fore.

As Darwin points out, animals alive today have a long

history of change behind them.

York*

The composite characteristics

^ C h a r l e s Darwin, The Origin of Species CSth e d . ; New
0. Appleton and Company, 1872T7
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for each animal,

including man, and the million© of year© of

©volution which have gone into making them,possess a certain
logic*

Life is harsh ©aid Qarwin and hi© followers*

It

was even more so, especially for man, back at the dawn of
time.

In that threatening and dangerous environment, only

the Fittest survived.
it lived.

If an animal could defeat its enemies,

If it could not, it died*

Any specie© of

animal fitting into the latter category would be selected
out by nature and become extinct.

Those in the former would

live and pass on their characteristics to future generations.
Occasionally, mutations would appear in a species.

If the

mutation hindered the survival of an animal, the animal
would have little chance of living long enough to pass
it on to the young.

Even if it did succeed in propagation,

the young inherltifogr; the debilitating gen© would have
chances for survival certainly less than that of a beast
not in possession of the characteristic*

Eventually, animals

in the former category would no longer inhabit the earth.
Other mutations, however, were beneficial instead of
detrimental.

A new trait emerging in an animal which would

aid in the creature*© survival would, of course, have
a very good possibility of being passed on to future
generations for the same reasons a detrimental character
istic would not.

Man, too, genetically handed down trait©

aiding hi© successor*© survival.

Just as other animals, man

is the product of a long history of evolution.

The character

istics he possesses are all in his composite make up because

as

they aided! In hie ancestors* Fight; For survival.®®
These inborn Features are not solely physical.

Mental

characteristics likewise evolved from the animals* need to
live*

Conscious or subconscious impulses,

instinct©! drives,

needs, and actions all have a similar reason For existing.
Graham Wallas saw that®®
impulse » . * ha© an evolutionary history oF it©
own earlier than the history oF those intellectual
processes by which, it is often directed and modified*
Our Inherited organisation inclines us to re-act in
certain ways to certain stimuli because such
reactions have been useful in the past in preserving
our ©paeias. Some of the reactions are what w@
call specifically *instincts,* that is to say, im
pulses toward definite act© or series of acts,
independent of any conscious anticipation of their

^®Th© question of whether man ha© genetically acquired
trait© or culturally acquired {experiential 3 ones has never
been satisfactorily answered.
For various approaches to
the question and for the application of them to politics, see!
Alexander Alland, Jr., Evolution and Human Behavior {Garden
City, New Jerseys The National History Press, 19673f Robert
Audrey, African Genesis {New Yorks Dell Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1970}| Robert Andrey, The Social Contract {New Yorki
Atheneum, 1970}; Peter Corning, "The Biological Base© of
Behavior and Some Implication© for Political Science,** &?orld
Pp11t 1cs,XXIII {April, 19713, 381—370; Donald S. MacBae,
**Darwinism and the Concept of Social Evolution,” The British
Journal of Sociology,X{June, 1959}, 105-113; M .F . Ashley
Montagu, Culture and the Evolution of Man {New Yor k ;
Oxford University Press, 19683; Desmond Morris, The Human Zoo
{New York? McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196931 Desmond Morris,
The Naked Ape {New Yorks
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 19673;
Albert Sorni't,' f,Towarde a More Biologically-Oriented Political
Science,” Midwest Journal of Political Science XII {November,
19683 , 550-567 1 Lionel 'Tiger, Men" in ''Groups {New Yorks
Random
House, Inc., 19693; Graham Dallas, Human Nature in Politics
{New Yorks F.S. Crofts & Co., 1981*11 Leslie A • White, The
Evolution of Culture {New Yorks
McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 19593.
2 ®Walia©»

Human Nature In Politics, p p . 48-49•

probable effects. Thee© Instincts are sometimes
unconscious and involuntary? and sometime©, in the
case of ourselves end apparently of other higher
animals, they are conscious and voluntary.
But
the connection between means and end© which they
exhibit is the result not of any contrivance by
the actor, but of the survival, in the past, of the
*fittest9 of many varying tendencies to act.
There have been a number of motivating drives found In
almost all animals.

The need for animal group© to have

their own territory is an obvious example.

Should another

group encroach upon this area, the animals will fight to
repel them*

The encroaching group, on the other hand, the

farther it gets from its own territory, will come to lose
much of its self-confidence making it easier for them to be
repelled*

Territoriality helps the species survive by

giving each group its own food-producing area free from
other groups*®^
Drives are evident in the creature*s uLviaus desire
to live.

However, the drive to live will occasionally be

held in check when the group is threatened and an animal may
sacrifice himself because the drive for the species* survival
is even greater than the urge for life itself.
Another drive is the desire for dominance which
results in hierarchical structure© being formed.®®

® 7 Ardrey, African Genesis, pp. 35-60.
®B Ibid*, pp. 81-83*
^9 Ibld*, pp. 91-118.

within

animal© is found the desire to achieve high status.

The

urge, as all other©, fluctuates from animal to animal
and Only a few have it to any great degree*

These few

will compete with each other until one alone sits a© king of
the hill*

Desire alone, of course, is not enough.

Other

skills, such as fighting ability or oratorical skill, are
needed*

In any event, a leader does arise.

Below him is

arranged a hierarchy, a "pecking order," according to
abilities*

The leader, of course, gets the choice pickings.

At the other end of the spectrum, the individual farthest
removed from thd leader is given the leftovers.

While

others nearer the top may occasionally challenge the leader,
he is,on the whole, recognized as being dominant and his
position is infrequently contested.

To challenge and to

lose could mean loss of life or exile, either of which has
drives often stronger than the one for dominance,

Which

urge is strongest in a creature varies, and when there is a
conflict between two or more drives, the most dominant will
win.
The natural inclination for forming hierarchies ha©
become a beneficial survival trait passed on to man*© de
scendants.

One man against a larger creature does not have

much chance of success.

Yet, he must kill the beast, either

for food or to rid himself of a threat,

Man, therefore,

learned to join with other men; and in order to succeed
in their endeavors, a leader arose and was accepted*

Those
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men who were able to submits iso a leader were able tso survive
and genetically pass on the submission trait:.
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Those not;

able to do so were defeated by either human or non-human
creatures*

Anyone who has seen boys at play has seen the

outcropping of the traits of dominance and submission as
a leader, a captain, a quarterback is certain to emerge and
be accepted*

Also, in witnessing the Inordinate amount of

concentration placed on presidential elections over those
of other American elections, it becomes even clearer that
people do Indeed have certain, inborn "biological demands
. . . and they will continue to demand a leader in the form
of an identifiable, solitary individual*

It is a fundamental

pattern of their species, and there is no avoiding it."®*
Since the desire for one leader came from the need to
survive, it fluctuates according to the degree of tension
an individual feels.

When his world is most threatened, he

will allow and actually help power to be concentrated in an
Adolf Hitler or a Winston Churchill,

when times are more

calm, the desire for a solitary strong leader, in turn, dimin
ishes! and a Churchill is then dismissed from his post of
dominant power holder*

In other words, it "is proportion

al to the distress of the followers*

on

Hence, the leader

* “ 0 view it from an experiential viewpoint, it is
not difficult to see that from birth one is taught to respect
and accept authcrity--first in the family and later in the
larger society*

31.
Morris, The Human Zoo, p. 55.
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who in fact* ©marge© wiil be considered indtspeneible toy his
Follower©* in proportion to the magnitude of th© task at
hand .” 3 2
An oligarchy possesses th© power to form policies in
all societies.

The size of the minority will vary and, at

times, one individual will ©merge a© a dominant power holder.
Those constituting the ruling class do so because of their
own capabilities and desires*

Th© majority of a ©tat©’©

citizenry allow an oligarchy to rise and function because of
their own lack of desire for power and their inborn need
to- be led.

gp

Oankwart A. Rustow, ©d«, Philosophers and Kings
Chaw York 2 George Braziller, 1970j, p. 31.

CHAPTER II
FEAR AND REACTION

Public policy primarily emanates From the province
oF a Few individuals.

An understanding of what lies behind

the policies can only be discovered by an examination of
those figures.

The effort must be made to look beyond the

exterior countenance of the possessor© of power and bring
to light their innermost recesses.

Only in the turbulent

inner area can one try to decipher whet it is that causes
man to act.

Somewhere within the power holder are found

motivation© which were placed within him at his conception,
drives which were experientially spawned, and reasons for
existing which he ha© formulated*

These motivations,

drives,

and reasons all have direct application to why public
policy occurs.

Investigation© into the inner sector of man

must be preceded by the reminder that what is located and
called truth Is done so only with the belief of there being
no absolutes in this complex world, least of all in its
moat complex ersature— m e n .

But only by attempting to

understand the individual's thought© and drives, can one come
to know man.

And only if one knows man, can one know hi©

policies*
In the previous chapter, mention was made of theories

3a

of man biological in nature*

These thoughts held roan, like

all animals, evolved out of a struggle for survival*

He

had desires to live--►drives to live--genetically passed to
him by his ancestors*
need for a leader*
mechanisms*

From the drive to live came men’s

and other mental and physical survival

In what is certainly overly simplistic logic,

life is in essence survival*

To maintain existence is to

meet and overcome threats to existence*
live*

Man needs food to

He will devote his mind and body to surmount anything

menacing his food supply*

He will do likewise to any chal

lenge that may, or actually does, block any of the other
needs or drives he feels must be preserved for his continued
survival*

The basic underlying point needing to be ©tressed

is man does realize the presence of threats to his existence*
He sees obstacles strewn along the path of hi© life and 1©
afraid*
The need for a leader has been passed down through
generations of mankind as a result of the struggle for
survival.

In the same manner* the ability to fear has been

Implanted in man’s mind, and it has been a prime explanation
for man’s survival*
unnecessarily•

Fear keeps man from risking his life

Fear gives man the time to plan how to

react to a threatening situation*

1 Supra,
,

pp. S©**29.

James C* Qsvieseven ©hows
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that Fear, in marginal etuantitles, must: be preeertt For mart
t:o act: at all *

While extreme Fear is recognized as being

detrimental in often leaving one so distraught he would be
unable to act, a complete absence oF Fear will make one tin*
aware oF the threat or the need to act at all.^
An array in combat will Find after a Few engagements
it is in some ways better in condition than it was beFor©
physical conflict» because it now possesses experienced
Fighting personnel.

but let war drag on without any new

inFusion of replacements in its ranks, and the army will
likely lose much of its vitality.

In any list oF reasons

explaining the happening, room would have to be made For the
presence oF Fear.

It is the so-called #*fearless” soldiers

who will ©park the troop© and at the same time put their
own lives into extreme danger.

They will eventually come to

lose those lives, and the array*© driving Force will be
similarly lost.

It is th© First to take cover, to Feel

Fear, who remain alive.
Fear is a survival mechanism Found in every person.
As each person is in someway© different, so, too, is his abil
ity to Fear and the causes of those Fears.

Fear comes

about as the result of the knowledge something one considers
important is threatened.

Fear of losing this something

stirs man to act or not to act.
p

Fear 1© the cause behind

□avies, Human Nature in Politics, pp. S8-69.
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man* © motivation--behind the reason© of a leader*© issuance
of public policies#

As Robert Ardrey ha© written, "The

world of the animal is a world of fear.**^

The world of the

power holder is no different*
The ability to fearj the drive© for dominance, territory
obtainment and defense 5 and the need for leadership have all
been genetically pre-coded into every man*© system.

Their

beneficiality to the human animal has bean explained*

In

attempting to discern man*© basic nature, these characteris
tic© must be examined*

Other traits do certainly exist*

One of the most important of these ha© been the ability
of an individual to learn from hi© own and other*© experiences.
The latter fact allows a person to gain knowledge of the
surrounding environment from on©*© contemporaries and, more
importantly, from one’s elders*

In phrases reminiscent of

others previously stated, man’s ffcultural capacities evolved
because they enhanced the ability of Chi© 3 ancestors to ©urvive .*'4
A person, then, i© able to absorb and comprehend
instructions as to what he should fear.
by planned example*
touch of fire.

He is influenced

As a child, he is told to fear the

He may touch it anyway, but he will do so

3 Ardrey, African Genesis, p • 60*
^Corning, Biological Bases, p. 338*
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only with some measure of apprehension.

Then, in learning

his elders were correct: in this on© instance, the child*®
questioning of other lesson© will be dulled.

The Fear of a

possible deprivation also motivates the person to listen to
and obey other teachings.

Th© result© of these planned

cultural admonishments will have a long term affect upon the
human personality and the motivations of hi© later actions.
Each child, of course, is taught differently and with diverse
examples giving each person a separate and distinctive per
sonality just as there is some heterogeneity in the genes
each individual inherits.
Not all learned instruction is accepted as planned.
The person*© own individual conception of what he is taught
gives him his own explanation of the world.

Also, not all of

the input into a child*© mind is planned by his eiders.
Often unoontrived experience©, and the resulting answers man*s
mind forces him to search for to explain fearful phenomena,
shape hi© view of the surrounding environment and hi® piece
in it.

Once again, the view is different for each persons

and while all motivations do have fear as a foundation,

in

other regard© the drives vary from person to person.
Not only do man*© motives vary, but so, too, do the
actions he has been taught, and he ha® discovered on hi© own,
to execute when faced with a threat.

Mi© oholee of response

is either dictated by what experience has shown was the beet
method to defeat the threat, or what would be th© consequences
of failure to act or not to act.

The Spartan child in
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Plutarch*© Lives allowed a Fox he had stolen and hidden under
his coat: to disembowel him rather then make a move that
would betray himselF.®

Experience had shown him whippings

and shame would be the consequences heaped upon him should
he show a sign of weakness*

Faced with two threats*--the

Fox and punishment— he suFFered the necessary result oF
not acting upon what he considered to be the lesser menace*
He Feared and he reacted by doing nothing.
relieved the major Fear that he Felt*

His action

And,recalling Davies,

man acts only out oF Fean.
The heterogeneous experiences and conceptions roan
has, when applied to the atmosphere of th© Leviathan,
show that, "political reaction is Far more personal, Far less
abstract and ideological, than either students oF citizenry
or citizen© themselves are wont to recognize.

* . . CTjhe

eFFect oF words is Far less than th© individual experience
. . . oF assorted end intensely Felt deprivations."®
It is to those deprivations Harold Lasswell Focused
upon in an attempt to explain man*© political behavior*
Using Freudian concepts, Lasswell Felt th© experiences oF
a child will be reFlected in his adult actions when Faced
with the real world*

IF a child receives something having

®Plutarchus, Lives* in Plutarch*© Lives, trans• by
John Dryden, revised by A.H. Clough, I CBostpns Little,
Brown and Company, 1924], p. 100.
®Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p* 189*
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good connotations for him, he will react, e.g. smile,
when he discovers it is nothing to fear.

If he fears a

loss of something, he likewise will react, e.g. throw a
tantrum.

In essence, there is a power relationship where

"extreme deprivations are threatened or inflicted against a
challenger| and what the infant-child does initially is to
treat every discomfort as a provocation for every form of
expression at hi© command,

jtt ^i© not too far fetched to say

that everyone is born a politician, and most . , • outgrow it
Why has th© politician-— -the power holder— failed to
outgrow It?
Lasswell would ©ay in answer there were certain in
fluences in the childhood of the power holder causing him
to have feelings needing expression.

)■
In later life, he die-

r

placed these private motives upon public object© and ration
alized the displacement In terms of public interest .8

To give

an example, a child may come to fear and hate his father as
the result of an oedipal complex.

As he grows older, the

child will transfer the hate for his father— for authority—
into a public figure, such as a king.

He will come to ration

alize any of his following attack© upon the monarch by saying
he did it to help free the enslaved people of his country*

^Harold 0. Lasswell, Power and Personality [New Yorkt
W.N. Norton S Company, Inc., 19481, pp. 159-160.
8Sees
Harold 0. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics
CNew Yorkt The Viking Pres©, 19621} and his Power and
Personality.
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TH# successful seekers of power move From ore socle!
\

ststus -to another**From outsider© to oligarchs*

Fear caused

these move©, and because oF being placed into a strange and
therefore uncomfortable environment, Fear also resulted From
it*

Failure to satisfy a need In their youth or adolescence

caused these move© and PI eft permanent, active [benign or
malignant} lesion© that kept these men in tension Forever
after*M^

MThe power seeker • * * pursues power as means of

compensation against deprivation*

Power is expected to over*

cone low estimates'of the self, by changing either th© traits
of self or the environment in which it Function©*” *®

These

personal Fear© are the causes For the reactions that become
public policy*
Harold Lasswell has effectively applied the impact of
personality to the political world***

Even if one was to

%3avies, Human Nature In Politics, p. 95*
*®Laeew©ll, Power and Personality, p. '39.
^*Lasswell is not alone in writing on th© topic• A list
of two-hundred, thirty books was already compiled in 1956
dealing with the authoritarian personality alone* Seel Rich-*
ard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature
Relating to the Authoritarian Personality through 19SS,”
Journal of Psychology, XLV [April, 195©}, 171-199•
For more
generaT discussion on the subject,- see: Fred I* 'Oreenstein,
wThe Impact of Personality on Polibices An Attempt to Clear
Away Underbrush,” American Political Science Review, LXJ
[September, 1967}, 639-641$ Fred I* Sreensteln, ”Personality
and Poiiticslf, American Behavioral Scientist, XI [NoveiuberDecember, 1967},r
Leroy N* Rleselback and George I.
Belch, Psychology and Politics [New Yorks
Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc*, 1969 jT

disregard the biologist © 1 theories on genetic pre-coding of
characteristics, those who have made studies such as Lasswell1© help In substantiating Fear as the cause oF public
policy.

Most of those studies treating a combination of

personality and politics, deal with the attacker of authority
— the seeker of power.

Yet, whet should happen to him

should he succeed and Find himself a© the new Father Figure?
The corsepenting uneasiness is easy to understand.
As mentioned above, Fear both caused his move© and resulted
From them.

The biologists have described the inborn need

For a leader*

Because a seeker answers what For him is a

more pressing drive, does not eliminate his need to be led*
The need should be expected to be Found in everyone, including
the dominant power holder,
not met,

Fear results when that need is

Erich Fromm also pointed out the tension Felt

when one is in a threatening situation and has no higher
authority to which be can turn.
constantly Faced with threats*

Certainly, a power holder is
Thomas Hobbes actly described

the situationi ■
During the time men live without a common Power to
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition
which is called Warref and such a warre, as 1 © of
©very man, againet ©very men, , • , [Such time© Find©
one in) continual! Feare, and danger of violent
death| And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, end short.

i&Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [New Yorks
Company, Inc,, 19501, pp. iQ3-l&4.

E*P, Dutton and
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As Hobbes Further noted, for* the head of a state, there is
no power to keep him in a w e . i 3

He is In "eontlnuall fear®.”

And when in fear the phiid, or the dominant power holder, re
acts.
What are those fears that haunt the power holder and
cause him to react?

What fears motivate and influence hia

public policies?
The first and foremost urge in man is to survive.
The genetically pre-coded drive is o b v i o u s in all creatures*
Without the urge to live, man would have long ago become
extinct.

The fear for the survival of self, then, is th©

single-most prominent trait in man.

In a physical sense, one

would expect to find in everyone both th© desire to live
and th© anxiety that life may fa© taken away#

Fear for life,

then, is one Feature having a bearing upon the formulation

r.

~

of public policy.
However, the fear for one1® survival is not limited
toe a physical self.

Included within the need to survive is

an individual*s mental self as well*

Each p©reon--each

personality--needs certain things to make himself whole.

Only

fay answering those hereditary and experiential drives which
move his soul can the power seeker find hie true ©elf.

Self-

actual ization is the goal moving him to attack authority and

l3 Ibid., p. IPS
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•take power far himself *1 ^
far each man there are certain intangibles he desires
to acquire--he must acquire*
”mak© life worth living*”
is whole*

These are the things that

Once they are acquired, the men

His self is actualized*

whole self worth conserving*

He lives and has m

Man now fears for his survival*

It i© the separate fear of not grasping those intangibles-and thus one*© ©elf— that spurs men to action in an effort
to acquire them*

Once possession of these incorporeal sub

stances— and one*a ©elf— is accomplished, man acts to insure
their survival*

Any threat to hi© tangible or intangible

self causes fear in man*© heart and he will react*

He

knows If those things are lost, so, too, is he*
The true power seeker is differantiated from hie fellow
man by his Inner need for power*

In order to actualize hi©

true ©elf, and thereby be something worth saving, the seeker
must grasp the power, the seat of authority, the leadership*
There are naturally going to be others who will compete
with him for the prize*

Yet, he will compete.

He will make

any sacrifice to achieve his goal, because for him "power
Ci©3 the magic potion that £pan3 change poverty to wealth,
failure to success, crime to virtue, and ignorance to brillianoe.,,*s

l^for the explanation of self-actualization which has
influenced this line of thought, sees Davis's, Human Nature
in Politics, pp. 53-60.
l®Nenad 0* Popovic, Yugoslavia? The New Class in Crisis
CSyracuse, New York? Syracuse University Press, 19633, p. IS.

42

This is the power seeker*® destiny.

Never to have Fulfilled

it, i© never to heve lived.
While it i© the drive for power which separatee th©
leader from his followers, the leader also has imbedded
within himself other need© that must be satisfied in order
for self-aotuaiizetion to be accomplished.

Even should the

seeker grasp his Golden Fleece of supreme power, should his
other needs fail to be satisfied,}he will still not be a
complete self.

Once any needs are acquired, they must be

preserved in order to remain viable.

Whether or not one ever

achieves ail of his goals is a point th&t can be debated.
Yet, a© each goal is reached, each need fulfilled, man
stands nearer to being whoie— perhap© not in the eye© of
others, but at least within his own mind’s eye.
tured desire must be retained.

Each cap

If it is lost, one is even

less of a whole self than he was when he had it but still
lacked the main goal of hi© sights.
For example, why was Napoleon exiled to Elba and St.
Helena?
The basic reason was **without his adoring public, he
could not so irrepressibly wage war and conquer nations.
short, by removing him from France and hi© adoring public,
he was made into somebody other than Napoleon.*1*®

*®Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 277.

in
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Fear of never achieving his goals, as well as fear
of losing those already acquired, force© “the power holder
to act— to make public policy.

He fears for position,

acceptance, esteem,1egacy, creation, power, charisma, and
ideology.

He reacts.

CHAPTER III
FEAR FOR LIFE

The desire For life--that on© supreme motivating
Factor which has shaped and governed man’s existence--is
present in ail men.

So, too, is the Fear of the physical

self being returned to the dust From which it came.

However,

each man, though realizing immortality in an earthly sense
is impossible, tries to Forget th© approaching darkness.
He undertake© various pursuit© to occupy hiroeelf and tries
to remove thought© of the unavoidable demise from hi© mind.
Man will find an^
activity in which the individual happily loses
himself— getting so absorbed that, at certain times
and in some situations, he is able to forget himself
in the performance of activity which he enjoys
primarily for its own sake and not primarily because
he thereby feeds or protects himself, hi© family,
hi© community-—or because he can give socially
acceptable vent to hi© aggressions, gain great
deference, or bend people to his will.
For some, the activity is th© seeking and holding power.
On the face of it, it would appear as if a person
with a healthy desire to live should be expected to find an
occupation other than politics.

For the power seeker, th©

percentage© in favor of a long life would seem to greatly
diminish if he is victorious in his quest.

The dominant

^Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 59.
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power holder, especially,
Frustrations.

is the target of many latent

For those who despise the Father --Figure and

For those who seek his position, the sword has been believed
to be often a more effective tool than the ballot box in
removing the leader From his position.
What Fear the power holder does possess in regard
to his life is more oF a Fear For his position--his actualized
selF--than For his physical 1 i Fe.

The assassin does not

attack an Abraham Lincoln or a William McKinley.
a President Lincoln or a President McKinley'.

He attacks

As Harold

Lasswell pointed out, the assassin pulls the trigger, not
on the average citizen, but on the Father-authoritarianFigure.

It is the position the power holder represents

that is murdered, not th© person.

When a Czar Nicholas II

or an Emperor MaxemiIlian Is overthrown and then executed,
It is because, by holding the positions they do, they stand
in th© path oF the power seekers who can only actualize
their individual selves by permanently removing these ob
stacle© ito their destiny.

One© again, it is the position,

not the individual, upon which Frustration and hpt© has been
directed.

IF Fear For physical liFe was Found to be the

most pressing drive within the power holder, he would be
expected to remove himself From offio© and thus From the
Focal point of enmity and danger to his person.
However, he does not do so.
he must retain his position.

For hi© self to be whole

Only then is he a true self
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worth preserving.

Then, the Fear For liFe will emerge.

He

will react to protect himsolF by either ignoring the threat,
removing himself From it, taking steps to eliminate it, or
combinationscoF all three tactics.
Whether or not the Fear for life is present to any
great extent within a leader,

in the first place, will be

the result not only of the present environment, but of the
method by which power was initially acquired and later
tained.

IF the throne was attained and, or held by violent

methods, e.g., in Russia, this gives an acceptability For
such techniques to other power seekers.
similar methods themselves*

They will use

The realization oF possible

physical attack will necessarily cause concern within a
power holder.

In nations with a strong heritage oF legal

or traditional pathways to power, e.g., Britain, there would
however be little anxiety concerning attempts to take the
power holder* s life by the seekers.

There will always be

some Fear of the assassin, along with the realization that
little can be done about it.

However, what would happen if,

in the case of John Kennedy, the bullet had merely grazed
him?

Would the legally elected President then have become

more Fearful and taken steps to withdraw From possible
threats?
Ghana*s Kwame Nkrumeh was an Individual who did
attempt to hide From his Fear*
he Feared For it.

His life came to be in danger}

Yet, he refused to relinquish his position.
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The result was that he isolated himself in Christianborg
Castle in an effort to escape the assassin’s bullet*

He

became dependent upon hie Friends end conflicting intel
ligence agencies For information.

Those Friends and agencies,

seeking power For themselves, only gave Nkrumah information
thought to be pleasing to him and thereby receive his Favor
in return, or information which would discredit their
O
rivals.
Nkrumah*s Fear For life caused him to rely on
others who sought power.

He was afraid to go into the

country and seek the truth with his own eyes*

As with

Kwame Nkrumah, the Fear For life is not often reflected
directly in public policies.

Action is usually reserved

For different anxieties, such as the Fear For position.
The indirect effect of the Fear for life is mostly seen in
itsJ influence on the source of information upon which the
power holder bases his policies.
When tension is high over the belief his life is In
danger, the power holder will often remove himself from the
real world and be forced to rely upon power seekers for
information.

To be forced to see the world through the eyes

of another is dangerous for the holder of power.

His personal

instincts brought him his position and are now dulled.

His

senses which have a *,FeeiT, for what is occurring in his

2w. Howard Wriggims, The Ruler’s Imperative CNew York t
Columbia University Press, 196937"P • i&4.'
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nation are likewise removed From direct stimulation.

The

Fear For liFe may thereby shape policies that have unFavoretole
reactions among the populace and, or the powerFul groups.
The position oF power will then be threatened by their die*
satisFaction.°
A diFFerent indirect influence of the Fear For life
upon public policy is possibly seen in the case of AdoIF
Hitler*

Hitler was often in ill health and Felt that his

life would be short.

Once he consented to being examined

by a Or. Theodor Morel!•

The results oF Following the

doctor*a advice brought the German dictator temporary relief
and he was Forever after of the opinion that Morell was a
miracle worker*

in actuality, the doctor was giving Hitler

a wide variety of injections oF questionable medical value.
A number of Hitler’s intimates later Felt that their leader
had undergone a change after Falling under the doctor’s
spell*

The result was all of Hitler’s later maneuvers were

the supposed consequences of Morell’s medications.^
For the power holder who has used violence as a tool,
Fear For life may be directly reflected in some of his public
policies.

Nikita Khrushchev has mentioned Stalin’s anxiety

^The problem of isolation will oocur also For reasons
other than the Fear For life. Sees
Seedy* Twilight.
^Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. by
Richard Winston and Clara Winston CNew Yorks
Avon Books,
1971), pp. 1S2-156.
Speer himself doubts this thesis,
however, Feeling what Hitler did would have been done even
if he had not had any Injections.
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over hi© own safety.®

Part of the fear was the result of

the growing rivalry of Beria, the powerful head of the
Soviet’s secret polios.®
Stalin started to worry about Beria*© increasing
influence.
More than that, Stalin started to fear
Beria. . . . The practical means for achieving
Stalin’s goals were all in Beria*© hands.
Stalin
realized that if Beria could eliminate anyone at whom
Stalin pointed hi© finger, then Beria could also
eliminate someone of his own choosing, on his own
initiative.
Stalin feared that he would be the first
person Beria might choose.
Stalin’s reaction was to try and rid himself of the threat.
,ti/
Realizing that the head of the secret police was a Mingrel,
Stalin published a decree saying that the Hingrels
had connection© with the Turks, and that some of them
were politically oriented toward Turkey.
Of course
the allegation was utter nonsense.
Because Stalin
was old and sick, he wasn’t consistent in following
through on his scheme.
Beria turned the whole thing
around in hi© favor and shrewdly insinuated himself
as Stalin’s henchman. . . . Beria assigned himself to
go to Seorgia and administer the punishment of the
Mingrels, the imaginary enemies.
Those poor fellows
were led to the slaughter like sheep.
The impact of the fear for life on public policies is
not great enough to cause the power holder to completely
remove himself from danger by resigning hi© office.

Often,

such fear is not even found to be great enough to have

®Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. by
Strobe Talbott CNew York:
Bantam BooksTJ 19713, pp. 319-321.
6 Ibid., p. 335.
7 Ibid., p. 336,

so

any impact on public policy at: ail, and it will b© ignored*
But if tbs anxiety is of any magnitude, the power holder
may coma to laolat© him©©if and thereby be forced-' to rely
on- second-hand information to formulate hi© policies*

Me

may even act directly to eliminate the <mu«« of hi© distress
and construct policies having direct influence upon the live#
of man*

CHAPTER IV
FEAR FOR POSITION

The ©elF-righteous, confident and egocentric power
seeker is motivated by inner drives he cannot fully compre
hend.

He only know© the prize of power lies within his

reach and it must be captured in order to find selffulfillment.

When he finally achieves his goal and grasp©

power, much, if not all, of his personal ambition© become
accomplished.

Yet the power holder, be he ©imply oligarch

or dominant leader, realizes the presence of other© who have
the desire to supplant him and whose hunger for power is
of no less a quantity then hi© was.

With the first flush of

success, the new power holder feel© omnipotent.

However, the

world doe© not sit ©till while h© luxuriate© in hi© new
found self.

He must produce answers to problems before the

power seeker© do or he will find hi© support drifting away.
Mened 0. Popovic in writing of the Communist Yugoslavian
oligarchy Cthe new class] says:*
Individual© belonging to the new class have various
and even mutually oonfliotlng interests. Nevertheless,
each is dependent on the group as a whole in order
to achieve his respective degree of authority. . . .
Although united by common goals and enemies, new-class

^■Popovic, The New Class In Crisis, p. 13.

member© differ in that some are deeply committed to
the new class, others less deeply committed#
Ail,
however, are frightened of losing whatever authority
they possess*
They, as do all power holders, fear the loss of their position
W* Howard Wriggins devotes his book, The Ruler*© Imperative,
to the problem as applied to the leaders of Africa and Asia*
He aptly point© out, "if it were possible to measure the
attention a ruler gives to different problems, it could prob
ably be shown that he devotes more time and effort to aggrega
ting ©round himself and his government sufficient political
power to permit him to stay on top than to any other ©ingle
purpose.**^

It is the position of power which places the

oligarch high above the masses*

To lose the position is to

lose the whole self— to no longer be completely alive#

The

power holder fears such a loss as he would fear for hi©
physical self and he reacts*

He attempts to eliminate his

opponents, reassure his allies, and sway the majority to
allow him to retain power.
Not© should be made her© of the term position.

It

refers to both the Internal position of power held by man, e*g
heed of a nation or member of Congress, and also to the ex
ternal position of the oligarch*© country, e.g., threatened
by invasion or supreme in the world*

If the nation*©

position falls, so, too, does hi© personal position.

^Wrigglns, The Ruler*s Imperative, p. 11.

To

remain In power then, the holder must have success in both
world and domestic affairs.

To fail In either realm is to

provide the seeker© with a lever which can be used to pry
the holders from power.
ment and feel afraid.

The holder© realize their predica
In response to the fear, the power

holders often will attempt to remove, damage or alter the
fear*© stimulus— the power seeker.®
The technique of exiling opponents ha© long been
employed to eliminate threats.

But it is the use of a

”nlght of long knives” to destroy any threats to a power
holder’s position that is deemed the ultimate response.
obvious ”night” occurred in Nazi Germany*
the early 1330’s was far from secure*

One

Hitler’s status in

The Sturmabteilung CS.A.3

had been an aid in helping him to gain office, but now It
reverted to a threat to his power.

The storm troopers had be

lieved Hitler’s promise of remaking Germany into a true
nationalist-socialist state*

They had believed and they were

growing restless waiting for results.

Rivalry between

those long-time Hitler followers and the German army was
likewise present*

Hitler’s future plans depended greatly

upon the army’s support.

The S.A. thus became a menace

to Hitler’s position, for if their desires were acceded to,

®See Ibid., pp. 159— 180. As Thomas Hobbes said in
his Leviathan, p. 102, ”There is no way for any man to
secure himself©, so reasonable, as Anticipationj that is, by
force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so
long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger
him.”
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Hitler*© position would be placed in great; jeopardy both from
those who could not; stomach the coarse methods the storm
troopers employed and From the S. A. itselF*

On June 30,

1934, Hitler acted and with hi© more trustworthy SohutgstaFFel
CS.S.3 executed the leading elements of the S .A

Hitler

had removed th© threat to his position causing him to
become ^extremely excited and * • • Inwardly convinced that
he had com© through a great danger*”®

He knew the threat was

no longer to be feared*
The Stalinist purges are similar proof that when an
oligarch senses threats to his position, he will unleash
a© much of the power at his command as is necessary to
eliminate it.

Khrushchev wrote

All of us around Stalin were temporary people.
As
long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were
allowed to go on living and working• But the moment
he stopped trusting you, Stalin would start to

W i l l i a m L* Shlrer , The Rise and,.Fall of the Third
Reich CGreenwich, Connecticut ? Fawcett Pub1icatioris,'' ino.«
19623, p. 87*
5Speer, Inside, p * 87.
®Khrushchev, Remembers, p p • 329-330•
Recall, also, the
actions taken by Herod when told of th© birth of a new king*
Another example of violent elimination of a threat to
protect position can be found in the executions undertaken
by L,-.« 5udsr.es© leadership of the member© of an attempted
1971 coup, ”Sbowdown Season in the Middle East— Sudan,”
Newsweek, August 2, 1971, pp. 34-35; and in the Jordanian
attacks upon the Palestinian commandos, Eric Pace, ”Jordan
Acknowledge© Clash in Effort to Oust Guerrillas from
Inhabited Areas,” New York Times, July 15, 1971, p. 7*
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scrutinize you until the cup of his distrust over
flowed.
Then It would tee your* turn to follow those
who were no longer among the living*
Complete and final elimination of a threat will not
always prove to be the best course to take*

Bloodletting

in order to remove e threat, even if done only according to
accepted legal practice, can often sponsor the rise of a
new and more pressing danger*

Actual us© of violence may

have th© result of bringing a power holder*© own name into
disrepute and making him into a target for suspicion rather
than trust*

The use of violence may also make a former

enemy into a martyr and provide a cause round which other
power seeker© will be able to gather adherents to employ
against the oligarchy*
The power holder will attempt to reverse roles to
avoid such an occurrence*

H© will portray himself as the

oppressed and the power seeker a© the "enemy of the state*"
Since the state is supposedly the composite populace, the
seeker is ©aid to be the "enemy of the people,” and the
power holder, then, become© th© people*© protector.

Th©

method damage© a power seeker end can be as effective a
tool as elimination.

A© an example, an oligarch of the

American South will portray Abraham Lincoln as a baboon.
An oligarch of the North will portray Jefferson Davis as a
Simon Legree*

Both actions are devised to damage a seeker

and turn potential support away from the camp of the power
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holder*® opposition.
The opposition’s freedom of speech also is controlled
by holding "discipline and subordination . • . C'to be) in***
dispensible to the very existence of the Cstate)*"®

To

©peak against the oligarchs is to speak against the people,
and the seeker is thereby appropriately punished if hi should
undertake those improprieties.

Anyone seen associating

with a threat is also openly or covertly punished*

The

Russian novelist, Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, whose work©
often portray the ugliness of Soviet society,

is looked

upon by the Russian oligarchy as a definite menace.

The

Soviet oligarchs react by refusing to publish his writings,
refusing his friends* work, holding his name up for disre
pute, and making it seemingly impossible for him to receive
hi© awarded Nobel Prize.

As is seen in Solzhenitsyn, a

threat is not always recognized as coming from a true power*
seeker.

Yet the oligarchy views Solzhenitsyn*s writing© as

damaging to their status. And since power fades when damaged,
Solzhenitsyn is punished.^

'rhe tactic has often been used in Communist state©
to label a regime*© opponents a© "revisionist." Oan Morgan,
"Poles Applaud Gierek* s Plan," Washington Post, Febr• 9,
1971, p. A 9 •
®Michels, Political Parties. P* 177.
^Solzhenitsyn Complains of Police Harassment, Surveil
lance," Washington Post, April 3, 1972, p. A16. Similar methods
have been employed in Greece. "How the Colonel© Run Things,"
Newsweek, January 19, 197D, pp. 32-37.
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Other times, attempts will foe made to turn enemies
into neutral entities,

if* not actual allies.

As noted, the

position of state must foe preserved to protect the position
of power holder*

Therefore, a Hitler will sign a treaty

with his mortal enemy Stalin to remove the threat of Russian
arms from forcing Germany to fight a two-front war.

A

Richard Nixon, who is looked upon as the arch enemy of
communism, will journey to Chin© and face the leaders of
what was one© considered the nRed Menace” in order to help
possibly check a growing Soviet threat felt toy both China and
the United States.*®
Threats can also be met by means other than an afterthe-fact action.

Machiavelii writes of King Ferdinand of

Spain who kept threats from arising by undertaking numerous
surprising maneuvers "which have kept hi© subjects* minds
uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their
results.

And these actions have arisen one out of the other,

so that they have left no time for men to settle down and
act against him.” **
To keep opponent© from coming into being, numerous tactics

*®To meet a possible American threat to Canada, the
Canadian Prim® Minister has sought closer relation© with the
Soviet Union*
Anthony Astrachan, "Trudeau Seeks Soviet Ties,
Cites Perils to Canada,” Washington Post, May SI, 1971, p. A l .
**Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 110.
Recall, also, the
suddenness of Richard Nixon’s action© in unveiling hi© intended
trip to China and the instituting of the wage-price freeze.
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other than those used by Ferdinand* also have been initiated*
The primary method is to show the people it is simply more
profitable to be the oligarch's ally than it is to be his
enemy.

While pain is inflicted upon the enemy, rewards

will be provided for the faithful.
Gaetano Mosea has described the unlikelihood of an
oligarch appearing unless an effective minority within the
state's upper echelon support© h i m . ^

Th© minority must

be kept loyal to the power holder if he is to retain his
position.

The power holder will thus show his gratitude

to his supporters.

He will allow a close ally to have a

few minor favor© bestowed upon him, or the power holder may
even allow the decadence of a Hermann Goering to go unchecked.
As the time for Abraham Lincoln's reelection in 1864 drew
near, h© too felt apprehension concerning his ability to
retain his position.

To hold the needed support of the

Radical Republican© in securing the nomination of his
party, Lincoln bowed to their demand calling for the removal
of Montgomery Blair from the office of Postmaster General.
The President wrote Blairs

"You very well know that this

proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally

^ S e e Wriggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, pp. 145-158.
i^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 53.
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or of fieislly **f^

Public policy was made under the vital

oopsIderatIon© of fear for position, then, when Lincoln
rewarded the requests of the Radical Republicans*
Other less 'important supporters are ©lac rewarded*
While. Individually holding only minor power, they collect
tivaly could pose a serious challenge if not induced to
remain faithful*

Lincoln again provides a good example in

sending a message to hie Secretary/of the Navy,, Bideon
Welles, which reflected 'hie- desire to reward his minor
supporter© *
M# de Hpreil who bears this, is the Editor of the
Massager-*Franco— Americ®in Celc*'3» a Prench Newspaper
published in the City of New York, which has
sustained the Union cause during this war with great
ability and energy*
I hope that any advertising which can legally
and appropriately given to a journal of hi© else©,
may be given to M. Moral1*
Attempts t© gain backing from certain groups within
a etata are ©ometlfnee made by exalting a member of the group
into the ranks of the visible oligarchy*

In the American

context, the post office department ha© been used, on
©cession, as a political plum which is given to such groups•
When John Kennedy first constructed hie cabinet, he desired
it to be representative of the various sections of the
country*

Th© time came to ©elect m Postmaster General|

^ A b r a h a m Lincoln, The Collected Work® of Abraham
Lincoln, ed* by Roy P. Basier, VIII (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
Ii5§I, p;.18*

15 Ibld., p. 343.

and since the west coast had yet to be represented on the
cabinet, "word went out to dig up a California feusineseman*
Someone suggested d« Edward Cay of Prudential Insurance * * « *
Hie credent isle eppesrsd good, end Hie rather Hasty appoints
ment • * . completed the Kennedy cabinet .f,^&
The carrot thus ia often looked upon as a much acre
valuable instrument then the stick*

Hungary1*© Janos feeder

and Ca:echoslov®kia*e CSuetav Hueek both came to power fol
lowing the destruction of popular movement* in their reapactive
countries by the Soviet military,

loth Kedar and Huesk were

in tenuous positions# knowing there was little support
amongst the people for them.

Their biggest desire was*, if

nothing else# to neutralise the feelings of the Hungarians
and the ©techs*

They desired to keep the people from being,

dissatisfied enough to rally behind an Issue the power holders
could have eliminated end overthrow! the oligarchy.

Kedar and

Husak thus sew to the pi a© log of large supplies of con
sumer goods in their nations* shops believing She* in seeing
to the .materiel dee ires of a people, it to- see to their
pel it leal needs*

Mhlle feeder end Musak mmy never be able

to receive widespread popular suppers# they have allayed
dissatisfaction against themselves* *7

Arthur M. Schleeinger, Jr., A Thousand Osya [Greenwich,
Connect lout i fassets Publication*, inoTT^IsEfTt P* 14©*
if

©speed Ceruther*, "Hueek Poliowe itmgarlan Line to
Strenghten Ceic.3 €*#ch Control,H Washington Poet, ©as* 18,
197©, p. A10* In this reel®, the peSpie do'^heve a voice*

SI

The power seeker occasionally even will be allowed to
Join the ranks of the oligarchy.

The reigning power holder©

recognize a threat met in this manner Force© the power seeker
to became a defender, rather than an attacker of th© ruling
class.

The Republican Richard Nixon*s selection of powerful

Democrat John Connelly to hold an important cabinet post,
a possible example of the practice in action.*-®

is

However,

"every oligarch is full of suspicion towards those who aspire
tc enter its ranks, regarding them not ©imply as eventual
heirs but as successor© who are ready to supplant them with
out waiting for natural death."*-®
Flagrant reward, also, can be a© dangerous as excessive
employment of violence.

Dissatisfaction can arise among those

who do not benefit from the oligarch©* generosity when they
see favors given to their own competitors.

They may then

become opponent© to the oligarchy and different policies

Following riots Poland lowered food prices.
"Poland Revoking
Increase," Washington Post, Febr. 16, 1971, p. A l 5 and Tunisia*s
leader removed an unpopular aid.
”L*Affaire Ben Salah,"
Newsweek, May 4, 1970, pp. 45-48.
Sweden*© ruling party is
ideologically opposed to monarchy and is preparing to remove
all powers from the country*© king.
Yet, the actions will
not be undertaken until after the present, popular king
dies in order to avoid giving an Issue around which the
power seeker© can rally support.
"Swedes Propose New Consti
tution," New York Time®, August 89, 1971, p. 4.
*-®"Mr. Nixon Enlists a Texas Democrat," Newsweek,
Oecember SB, 1970, pp. 13-15.
*-®Michels, Political Parties, p. 176*
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will have tie be constructed to deal with the mew threat
coming from those who were ignored.
Rather than always attempting to secure position
through the use of physical or material considerations, the
power holder often will try to make use of the spiritual.
Just as early kings claimed the legitimacy of their rule by
divine right, the power holder will attempt to gain alle
giance, and thereby support for hi© position, by inculcating
an ideology, with provisions supporting the right of the
oligarchy to rule, within the populace.

Ideology believed

bring® a ruling class vast power in its ability to roue© th©
normally apathetic.

Conflict over power forces both seeker?

and holder to construct chains of thought which will bring
as many under their spell as possible.

They know their

effectiveness in this regard determines whether "they may
stand or fail in th© rough struggle© in which they engage."^®
Ideology is constructed to attack or protect the
oligarchs, not to give the rivals a reason for being.

Th©

opponents have found their meaning for life in the desire
for status--power is their god,

With ideology being but a

tool, it is understandable why the Yugoslavian ruling class
"is so sincerely concerned with its struggle for survival
that it is capable, if necessary, of abandoning world

^Merriair, Political Power, p, 37,

S3

S'l
communism to safeguard its own.M&i
The fear For position produced similar reaction in the
early nineteenth century*

To counter opposition and relieve

the resulting Fears* church and state united their spiritual
and secular worlds to withstand the "rationalistic and revo
lutionary currents" which threatened them both*®®
As Mao Tse Tung wrote a century later regarding hi©
own movement I

"It is to th© advantage of despots to keep

people ignorantj it is to our advantage to make them intel
ligent.

We must lead all of them gradually away from

i g n o r a n c e . " 2 3

kind.

The power holder has little respect for man

He will educate them-—shape them--to know th© truth e©

he sees it.

For if th© majority views the world as does the

power holder* they will agree with the oligarch as to th©
legitimacy of his rule.

The populace will then join with

the holder to defeat hie opposition and heir him consolidate
hie grasp upon power.
For the dominant power holder* the ideology he often
promotes is the cult of p e r s o n a l i t y H e

will promote him

self a© the nation*© savior and the embodiment of all wisdom*

^Popovio* The New Class in Crisis* p. 13.
Wriggins, The Ruler1"© Imperative, pp. 123-144.

Also see

22Mosca, The Ruling Claes, p. 92.
S3Mao Tse Tung, Mao Papers, ©d. by Jerome Ch*en
CLondons
Oxford University Pres©, 1970}* p. 103.
^ S e e Wriggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, pp. 91-107.
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goodness, and power*

The dominant: power holder attempts to

encourage the impression of his indispensibility.

IF he

should perish, the dominant power holder says, so, too, will
the country.

The populace must rally to him to ©eve the state

and themselves*

Charles dm Gaulle was one who used the

cult of personality as an effective tactic to remain in power*
0© Gaulle, when placing a referendum before the public,
would ask the French to vote as he desired.

Should they

fail to do so, he said he would tender hi© resignation.

Un

willing for a long time to be without his figure of stability,
th© French followed De Gaulle’s wishes until 1969 when a
referendum was finally defeated by French voters.
Occasionally, to strengthen his position, a pos
sessor of power will give the impression of resigning from
his office*

The dramatic act will shock the people into

th© realisation of his purported indispensibility.

They will

beg the power holder to remain in office, and the holder
will "reluctantly” accede to the "will of the people.”

s^Se© his speeches of May 24 and July 20, 1968, in
Keeslng*a Contemporary Archives, July 20, 1968, pp* 2281522816, 22817-22818.
Albania’s Enver Hoxha has also tried
to portray himself as indispensible.
Herbert Schmitt,
”Albania Clings to Backwardness,” Washington Post, Febr. 28*
1971, p. A25.
Leaders in the Kremlin are attempting to
reinstate Stalin as a great man so that some of his former
cult will rub off on them. ”Th© Middle Wey,Tt Newsweek,
January 5, 1970, pp. 22-23.
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Following -the disastrous war with Israel in 1967, Gamal Abdel
Nasser of Egypt Followed the described course of action and
successfully retained his position until his death.
As with other strategies designed to keep the power
holder in his position, the cult of personality also has its
limitations*

The use of it by the power holder is effective

only if It corresponds to the situation.^
tion© are fluid, always changing.

T ime and condi

Should the situation

drastically alter, the power holder will find the need to
rely upon new techniques to remain in office,

He realizes

the failure to do so means his fall.
Often, of course, there is an absence of a dominant
power holder.

Even when a dominant personage is present,

there are others who, failing to achieve dominance for them
selves, cannot become reconciled to any type of second-class
statu© within the oligarchy.

As a result, there is a decen

tralization of power within the state.

The rejected

individuals will return to their own regional bases of
support.

"Being unable to rule the whole country,

Cthey3 pre

fer to rule at home, considering it better to reign in hell
than serve in heaven." 27

86

□avid 0, Searing, "Models and Image© of Man and Society
in Leadership Theory,” Journal of Politic©, XXI CFebruary,
1969), 13-15.
' :
27
Michels, Political Parties, p. 198• This has occurred
in Belgium, Henry Glnlger, "Belgian Coalition, Off to a Shaky
Start Must Bring Together a Jigsaw Nation," New York Times,
Febr. 2, 1972, p. 18, and in Iraq, William Tuohy, ” Iraq*s New
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Should the oligarchs come under extreme attack From
their constituents, they may seem “bo bend with the pressure
and appear to relinquish some of their power.

"But their

submission is Feigned; they are well aware that if they
simply remain glued to their posts, their quality as execu
tants oF the will of the masses will before long lead to a
restoration
of their Former dominance."22
«
After examining th© restraining influences of the
Fear For position, the questions should toe asked:

Why did

the Fear Fail to prevent Adolf Hitler From launching his
armies ©cross the boundaries of Poland and leading his nation
into war?

Why was Hitler willing to risk Germany*s existence

and thus his own position a© head of one oF the world*s
great powers?
As with many others, the German leader was unwilling
to "reign in hell" when he could dream of capturing heaven.
Hitler*© self was only partially actualized after he suc
ceeded to Germany*© leadership.

He was not whole and thereby
i

not at the point of Feeling the need to conserve.

Hitler

remained a seeker at the same time he held dominant power
For Germany.

For his self to toe made whole, Hitler had to

have the German eagle grasp the globe in its claws.29

He had

Mood of Toleration Laid to Fiscal Troubles," Washington Post,
Oec. 7, 1970, p. A18*
22Miohel©, Political Parties, p. 173.
2% p e © r ,

Inside, pp. 281-323.
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to have Germany in the undisputed position of dominant power
for the entire world.

Hitler wae afraid his destiny would

never be realized by any other method, so he reacted by
plunging into war.
The power holder is confronted with no greater threat
than one made against hi© position.
to achieve status as a ruler.

Hi© life*© ambition was

To be forced no longer to

look up, but to be able instead to look down at the world,
ia the basic need in his life.
desire alon;©*

Yet, it is not hi© life’s

If he is successful, there are always those

waiting and attempting to supplant him.®®

In realizing his

survival is threatened, the power holder, just as hi©
ancestors before him, fears.

He reacts with every instrument

at his command to destroy those who would destroy him.

As

his fellow oligarch© are strong enough to topple him, they
must be rewarded.

As the people can be rallied to attack

him, the power holder in turn attempts to rally them to pro
tect him.

Public policy ha© been th© result more often of

®®At times the ruler will attempt to either avoid a
confrontation with the seeker or, at least, put the seeker at
a disadvantage when the confrontation occurs.
Zanzibar’s
Sheikh Absid Araani Karume attempted the former method when he
decreed there will be no election© for sixty years. Jim
Hoagland, "Zanzibar’s Revolution Becomes One-Man Rule,"
Washington Post, March IS, 197S, p. A16.
Former Prime Minister
Harold Wilson unsuccessfully attempted the latter course when
he called for British elections months before he was legally
bound to do when he saw poll© showing a great increase in
popular support for his party. "Polls Show Sain for Labor
Party,” New York Times, April 24, 1970, p. 9.
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the power holder*© reaction to -the Fear Far losing* or
never completely achieving, position than ©F any other single
cause.

CHAPTER V
OTHER FEARS

Public policy is often the result of a power holder*s
reaction to a threat lodged against his position.

However,

there are those powerful individuals whose positions are
relatively secure and fear for position is rarely found
materializing within them.

Also, power holders do not de

vote their entire concentration to worrying about the
tenuousness of their status.

Considerations other than

those dealing with the ruler's position often are at th©
root of many decisions.

On occasion, these other con

sideration© are inextricably bound to the fear for position.
Often times they have an impact of their own.

As with the

fear© for life and position, the other considerations deal
with desire© needing to be realized to make the ruler truly
whole.

When the desires are threatened, be it before or

after realization, the power holder reacts and public
policies are conceived.

Some of the desire© are acceptance,

esteem, legacy, creation, power, charisma, and ideology.
Upon acquiring power, and with each ascending step
into the upper reaches of the oligarchy, the power* holder
finds himself placed in a new environment.

The world he

enter© was only just before populated by oligarchs who looked
down on him, and he up at them.

To become comfortably
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situated in hi© new position, he desire© the acceptance
of hi© new peer group•

Until he Feels truly accepted, he

i© ill at ease and hi© self 1© not realized.

IF hi© ascension

is rapid, th© new power holder realize© many mannerisms
reFlecting hi© previous inFerior statu© will be all too
apparent: to both him and those whose approval he desires.
Fear oF not being accepted may cause the oligarch to make
decision© reFlecting what he Feels is expected of him or
what his new peers tell him he should do.
When Lyndon 0. Johnson was thrust into the Presidency,
he was Forced to ©ubmit to a time oF adjustment.

The staff

around him was dedicated to another Fallen individual.

While

Johnson oFten had been at odd© with them, it would be difficult to believe he did not want the acceptance of those who
had Formed John Kennedy*© circle of adviser©.^
Almost a usurper in his own mansion, sensitive to
the Fact that in his every move he was being compared
to Kennedy, he had, nevertheless, to carry on govern
ment in hi© own manner. This was the period when his
harsh, almost brutal treatment oF his own people
reached a peak. . . •
Yet, there he was, performing beyond any normal
human capacityf performing flawlessly as President,
though less well a© a human being; suspicious of those
around him, yet at the same time trying to Forgive;
unable to translate himself to the idiom by which
Kennedy had made the nation listen; conscious of hie
own style and resentful when comment was mad© on it
by the press • • • •
Many of Johnson*© initial act© were designed to show

^Theodors H. White, The Making of the President**-1964
iNew Yorks
Th© New American Library, Inc., 19663, p* 76.
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continuity both with what Kennedy had desired and with what
Kennedy*s staff told Johnson he had desired*

But, fear for

acceptance is something a strong individual cannot live with
forever.

He reaches the point where fear of losing one*©

individual self forces him to insist his entourage conform to
his desire© rather than he to theirs.

Johnson reflected such

a moment in a meeting with government officials concerning
a prearranged presentation of awards to distinguished
Americans*

Kennedy had decided to perform the ceremony over

the space of forty-five minute© and the official© assumed
Johnson would follow Kennedy’s plans.

"At which Johnson burst

out that he was tired of people telling him he had to do
this or that oh another thing because it hed been the most
important thing in the world to John F. Kennedy-*-it would take
him fifteen years to do it all*

He wouldn’t give the cere

mony more than ten minute© for television • • .
Johnson’s position we© secure, but his acceptance
was not.

He had to prove to himself and other© his indivi

dual ability to be made a member of the oligarchy’s highest
reaches.

Until he was elected President on his own, he

could never be certain of his acceptance as the chosen leader
among his new peer group•®

^Ibid., p. 75*
Haiti’s leader, Jean-Claude Ouvalier, has similarly
sought acceptance for his country within the world’s community.
Peter Sraestrup, "Papa Doc’s Legacy," Washington Post, May 2,
1971, p. 61.
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Han wants to- be looked upon Fondly and deemed by
other© to be important.

The oligarch also desires to b©

honored and the Fear For esteem arise© when the Feeling is
present of honor no longer being bestowed*

The oligarch will

often undertake action© he hope© will please his countrymen
and thus receive their continued respect and best wishes.
Abraham Lincoln on numerous occasion© bowed to entreaties
and pardoned condemned deserters.^

He had © deep "craving

For the approval of a wide public*

When the new© of Chancel**

lorsville burst upon him, his reaction was notionly ’Our cause
i© lost! * but the guest Ion, ’What will the people ©ay?’,,s
Lincoln needed esteem, without it he was no longer whole.

Hi©

unwillingness to plan For a harsh reconstruction upon the
South is at least a partial reflection of his need For esteem*
At times, however, esteem is withheld.

The leader’© *

eyes then turn, if they had not don© so previously, to to**
morrowj and the fear For legacy now become© a dominant
consideration For the leader can say it will be left to his
tory to Judge his actions.

”History will prove Lyndon

Johnson right," said Lyndon Johnson*
holder is in the spotlight.

The dominant power

His self will endure forever

in books and he wants the self that endures to be glorious.

^For example, see three of hla letters in Lincoln,
Collected Works, pp. 9, 205.
^Harold 0. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When,
How (New York*
HcGraw-Hill Book Company,- line."i iggg}, p, 187•

Not© 1© therefor® emphatically mad© of Richard Nixon being the
first President in history to initiate many undertaking©
such as hi© visit to China,®

The leader who must rely on

tomorrow to judge him may be less willing to shift and change
policies than one who must receive continuous cheer® from
the crowds#

The leader in the latter category, since every

act i© a possible issue around which the power seeker can
gather support, will be apt to quickly drop or revise
policies which are found to cause unfavorable response within
the citizenry.

The power holder who fears for legacy to a

greater extent than he doe© esteem can wait and allow
history to- provide his cheer©.
for the dominant power holder who has no reason to
fear for life, position, acceptance, esteem, or legacy, another
fear will often motivate many of hi© actions— the fear for
creation,

Most often found within the power holder who

brought his nation through great ordeal© and dedicated hi©
life to its construction, the fear for creation will direct
the leader to make policies assuring the product of his
work will continue to survive when he no longer is on the
scene.

The nation i© hi© creation and legacy,so long a© it

®Sae Carroll Kilpatrick, "President Stresses Peace a©
Hi© Aim," Washington Post, Febr. 18, '1978, p. A l . The fear
for legacy was evident in Nixon’s decision to ©end troops
into Cambodia*
He ©aid, "Whether X may be a one-term Presi
dent is insignificant compared to whether by our Failure to
act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be un
worthy to lead the Force® of freedom in this critical period
in world history." "Transcript of President’s Address to the
Nation on Military Action in Cambodia," New York Times, May
1, 1970, p. 2.
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lives mm He conceived it;, the
Tito of Yugoslavia is,

power* holder lives*
in essence, Assured of toeing the

dominant; leader of his nation

For the rest of his life.-

has no reason to Fear For his

position.

Me

The Yugoslav©

recognize him e© the Father oF their country, and he has
no need to Fear For esteem*his creation.

However, he does Fear For

Yugoslavia ha© oFten been in turmoil as the

result oF the rivalry of the many nationalities comprising
the country,

Tito*© dominance of hi© nation ha© been oF a

quality to hold the diverse peoples together.

Yet, with

advancing age, Tito realize© his presence soon' will toe gone
and, with it, his binding InFluence.

To assure a united

nation aFter he departs, Tito has seen Yugoslavia grant
some autonomy to the various ethnic groups within its
boundaries.

He also has moved to reorganize the presidency,

making it multiple in character and allowing representation
within it oF leaders of tooth the various reputelie© and oF
leading social and political organizations.

As Tito said,

"It has oFten been ©aid abroad that when I disappear Yugo**
©lavia will collapse*

In our country, too, there 1© much

©peculation about my successor.

I thought that it could

provoke m very serious crisis* . . • To spar© our socialist
community such e crisis, which ie desired by many, we must
carry out this reorganization CoF the presidency],n7

^Speech oF September 21, 1970 quoted in Keeping*s
Contemporary Archives, July 31-August 7, 1971, p. 24733.

Sine© non© of Yugoslavia1© 'power seekers can hop© tso
supplant Titoi they have looked to their home region© for ah
area to rule and have courted their various ethnic groups,
producing an intensification of nationalistic rivalry and a
threat to Tito*© creation.
responded:

In anger, Yugoslavia’s leader

f#People say that Tito is an empty gun , . . .

They will see this time that the gun i© not empty*
plenty of ammunition * • « '*,f®

We have

Tito fired the gun in

December, 1971, and purged m number of separatist Croat lead
ers.

In both instances of reorganizing the presidency

and purging the Croat hierarchy, Tito reflected a reaction
to threat© launched against hi© creation.*^
Tito knew it was his responsibility to provide for

®Supra» p. 65•
q

Speech of May 6, 1971, quoted in Keeping* a Contem
porary Archives, July 31-August 7, 1971, p. 24734.
l^Oan 'Morgan, #,Croation Nationalist© Threaten Unity
of Yugoslavia,f| Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1971, p. AS1 •
Dan Morgan, MYugoslavs Continue- Crackdown Against Separatist
Qroups,*’ Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1972, p. AS.
H t h © fear for creation also can toe seen in the
Syrian military’s moderate position toward Israel in order
to- keep Syria from toeing destroyed* Jess© w* Lewis, Jr.,
HAriny Takeover May Moderate Syrian Stance on M-Ideast War,”
Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1970, p. A29• The Shah of Iran
©Iso is attempting to strengthen hi© country before he
leaves the scene.
Jonathan C. Randal , '’The Shah1© Iran,M
Washington Post. Oct, 10, 1971, p. C4. Spain’s Franco, too,
has tried to assure continuance in his country of hi© work
by picking his successor*
"Juan Carlos May Take Oath a©
Franco1s Heir Wednesday,” New York Times, July IS, 1969,
p. 3.

the continued life of hi© creation*

Adolf Hitler knew it

was hit responsibility to complete his creation before his
death*

Mention has been made of Hitler’s fear for hie life,

13

and of the precautions he made to protect his position by
signing a treaty with Stalin**3

Albert Speer felt Hitler’s

belief in an imminent death motivated him to advance hi©
deadlines for hi© planned destiny**^
"create m great empire*

His ambition was to

All the Sermanio people© will be

included in it*

It will begin in Norway and extend to

northern Italy*

I myself must carry this out.

keep my health!"

If only I

The new Sermany was to be Hitler’s

creation! he alone could achieve it and time was short.
Hitler thus turned his divisions against the Soviet Union
before he had originally planned and opened a second front.
Hitler feared his creation would never be achieved end he
reacted*
The fears for power, charisma, end ideology often
have a direct relationship to the fear for position*

Usually

the amount of power held by an individual is the determining
factor in the position he hold© in an oligarchy.

The fear

for power, however, covers instances where position should

^®Sugra, p * 48«
*3Supra, p* 57.
14

Speer,

Inside* p. 156*
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more properly be termed office.

The fear arise© within an

oligarch who is secure in his office, but the power he
exercises from the office is threatened#

President Theodore

Roosevelt wee in no greet danger as regards his officeJ yet,
when he desired to send the American navy around the world by
way of Japan, Congress refused to fund the venture#

The

negative response to Roosevelt*© desire threatened his
powerf and in a reaction, the President sent the navy to
Japan anyway and told Congress to appropriate money to bring
them back#

The fear for power activated Theodore Roosevelt

, to respond#^®
The cult of personality has been an instrument long
used to secure the position of power for the leader. ^

The

power holder fears a lose of the cult— of charisma— for two
reasons#

Should the power holder lose his charisma— the

mechanism lying between hi© position and hi© enemies— his
position will become jeopardized#

Thus, the fear for charisma

Is linked with the fear for position#
is comforting to be honored*

On the other hand, it

Recalling the importance of

esteem for the leader, he fear© the loss of charisma a© it
results in the lose of esteem and a part of the ©elf worth

^ T h e fear for power also is seen in the attempts
of Richard Mixon to keep the reins of the military in his
hands#
MA Duel Over the Rower to Make War,** Newsweek,
May eS, 1970, pp* 29-31.
'
^Supra,

pp. 63-65.
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conserving.

Of course,

tg

charismatic authority 1© naturally unstable.
The
holder may loee his charisma, ha may Feel *for©ak©n
.by hie God, * * •• f its may appear. to hi© follower© that
*hi© power© have left him.* • . • Hi© follower©
abandon him, for pure charisma doe© rot recognize
any legitimacy other then on© that flow© from personal
strength proven time and again. . . . He gains end
retain© it solely by proving hi© power© in practice.
. . . His divine mission must prove itself by bring*
Ing well-being to hi© faithful follower©! if they do
not fare well, he obviously is not the god-sent
master.
To retain the qualitlea of the ”god-sent master,M
Cshould the fear for chari©me prove stronger than the fear
for position}, thepower holder will
rather

then risk alose of charisma.

abandon hi© office
Following World War

II, Charles de Gaulle retained the ohariem© he had often
shown*

Since the French government became more institutional

then personal in chareoter^From 1948-1946, Oe Gaulle left
hi© position to retain the charisma which would eventually
prove to bring him back to power in 1 9 5 © . ^
Seoause the need man feela ^or a leader fluctuate©
according to the dlffioultiae he is encountering,30 the
charismatic leader must continually reestablish hi© identity

Weber, economy and Society, ed. by Guenther
Both and Glaus Wittlch tNew York*
©sdminater Press, 1988},

p . 1114.
^ S t a n l e y Hoffman and Inge Hoffman, ♦•The Will to
Grandeur* de Gaulle a® a Political Artist,” in Rustow,
Philoeophers and Kings, p. ©89.
3QS u p r a , pp. 29-30.
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by Fulfilling hi© "divine mission” and '’bringing well-being
150 his Followers.” H e m e e d s times of upheaval to prove
■t

himself tso hi© constituency and tso himself,
Conditions oF di stiress have been . . . seized Cby
De Gaulle) with characteristic glee SO 3S Ho re— enact
his mission and Ho renew his charismai
whan he puH
on his general*© uniform before Hhe TV camera while
Algiers was rioting in January I960 j when he ©mashed
Hhe army rebellion in April 1951 . . . . Moreover,
Hhe ©Hyle of his Foreign policy . . . serves Hhe
Function of producing . . . mini-drama© t h a t ■renew
his appeal, ©s if he, Hoc, needed Ho create crises for
whose solution© he will be *erect end necessary* Cfor
example, . . . Hhe Canadian venture3*
Charisma, then,

1© more than merely a defensive

mechanism For the power holder*© position.

To be charismatic

may be the power holder*© greatest desire.

The survival of

his charisma thus is more important than any position.
Man seeks power to serve his own interests.

He use©

Ideology*— the great motivator of followers--©© a tool For the
preservation or acquisition of power

True ideology, how

ever, must be served by the individual*

But to be a slave

to an ideal' is difficult.^3
For the great majority of men, idealism alone is an
inadequate incentive for the fulfillment of duty.
Enthusiasm is not an article which can be kept long

2lj-foffman, ’’Will to Grandeur," p. 289.
PP • 82-63.
90
■^Michels, PolItleal Parties, p. 145.
Former 'Norwegian
leader, Per Bar-ten, took actions counter to his isolationist
ideology when he sponsored Norway*© move into the European
Economic Community. Still, it should be noted he later re
linquished his position rather than, continue the action. "EEC
Issue Topple© Norway*© Cabinet," Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1971,
p . A 15 *
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in store.
Men who will stake their bodies and
their lives For e moment, or even For some month© in
succession, on behalf oF a great idea often prove
incapable of permanent work in the service of the
same idea even when the sacrifices demanded are com
paratively trifling#
The joy of self-sacrifice is
comparable to a fine gold coin which can be ©pent
grandly all at once, whereas if we change it into
small coin it dribbles imperceptibly away#
To acquire power takes self-confidence and a
on self#

reliance

To be successful likewise takas pragmatism#

Woodrow

Wilson, a man who could be said to be idealistic in hie hopes
for the post-world War I world* stated:

"Politios must fol

low the actual winding© of the channel ofi the rivert
steer by the ©tars it will run aground.”®^

if it

However, as W .

Howard Wriggins aptly notes, "without ideologies defining
purposes, projecting a higher vision of the weaning and end
of it all, political life may coma to appear— as it may in
deed become— simply a gem© of jockeying for position, a
©I**S3£5© and cynical struggle for the s p o i l s # " ^
Man varies and to ©ay there has never been idealistic
motivation in the oligarchy must be regarded ©a, at best,
questionable#

There have been those willing to risk their

position of leadership in order to aid in their ideology*s
survival#

An example can be found in the early Christian

leaders who allowed themselves to be sacrificed rather than

^ W o o d r o w yilaon. Leaders of Men, sd by T*H, Vail
Hotter [Princeton, New Jersey!
Princeton University Press,
19SS3, p# 48#
SB^riggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, p# 144#
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deny their faith*

Perhaps Wilson forgot his adage when he

spoke out so vehemently in favor of a League of Nations*
Still the fear for ideology ae a motivating force behind
public policy has played but a minor role in the history of
the oligarch;*
Power holders have been motivated by many different
fears*

Pears for acceptance, esteem, legacy, power, charisma,

and ideology are factor© lying behind many public policies*
Just as with the fears for life and position, the importance
of the individual anxieties varies from person to person*
One power holder may be motivated primarily by on© fear*
Another oligarch may mak© policiesreflecting a wide rang©
of apprehensions*

Whatever the reason, the Importance of

the policies is in their ability to have great or minor
affect upon the lives of the nation and the citizen-

CHAPTER VI
AN EXAMPLE.!

JEFFERSON QAVtS

Various fiwrt Have been portrayed as motivating
Force© lying behind public policies of different power
To gain

increased insight into thebroad area

within which Fear

operates* it is beneficial to examine

holders*

on© power holder closely to see how his action© were governed
by fear.

The individual to be scrutinized is Jefferson

Davis who is recognized a© having been the dominant leader
of the oligarchy of the American South which came to
organize the Confederate States*

Though the "rule© of

the political game" in the Confederacy had a prohibitive
effect upon initiation of much domestic policy by © central
authority, important action© were undertaken by it© Fresi**
dent COavie} primarily as a
ness to submit to

result of fear*

In hi© willing**

his fear© by forming policies in the

restrictive atmosphere of the Confederacy* Davis is an
important figure to note.

For if Davis would act in such a

manner as to violate the "rule© of the game," how much
easier it would be for^a leader In a less prohibitive situation
to do likewise in the face of fear*
In the early day© following United States* independence,
Southerners desiring power were able to find self**fulflllment

S3

in the new American oligarchy.

The dominant power of their

section of the country in the sphere of Foreign trade, as
well a© in the economy of the rest oF the nation, dictated
the presence oF many oF their number in the rank© oF power
holders.

Virginians-^Seorge Washington, Thornes Jefferson,

and James M©di©an-->all played vital roles in the Revolution
and in the governing oF the newly Founded nation as all
three later came to reach th© pinnacle of power as President.
Besides being well represented In the Executive Branch, the
South at this time also held positions oF great strength in
the Congress and Judiciary as is evidenced by the presence
oF John C. Calhoun end John Marshall in the respective
branches«
However, times changed.

The Northern oligarchs were

gaining increasing power a© merchants and manufacturer©.
Immigration was swelling their populace,. Forcing it to
expand into new areas.

The South, on the other hand, could

match Northern expansion For only a limited time.

The

basis of the Southern economy was cotton, but th© condition©
upon which the crop9© vitality depended puickly reached
their limit*

Productive land was ruined and -after moves

into Alabama, Mississippi, and Fimelly Texas, new land
was not to be Found.

As more and more people Filtered into

the North, the South lost its strong position in the House
of Representatives.

As more states came into the Union, the

South, being land restricted, could only wage a delaying
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action against th© growing number© of Northerners in the
oligarchy with the Missouri Compromise of 1880*

Eventually,

the South lost control of the Senate*
Lack of land was not the only problem the cotton
economy faced*

Th© Southerners felt th©

need for slavery,

which had given the South economic wealth and thereby power*
The North1s economy had no ©uch need for slavery and it
began to agitate for the destruction of this form of
servitude.

While the South held great power in the Congress

and the Presidency,

it was safe from the

slavery and thus its position*

Yet, the

Northern threat to
North was expanding,

squeezing Southerner© out of the national oligarchyj and in
an effort to meet th© growing threat, th© Southern power
holders took steps to insure the maintenance of their way
of life*
To gain support from their fellow Southerner© and to
put an obstacle in the path of Northern dominance, the
oligarchs developed an ideology to justify ©nd protect
their position**

Best expounded by John G* Calhoun, the

rising * belief structure wee based on America*© sacrosanct Con
stitution and Oeeiaration of Independence*

Th© ideology’s

chief articles of faith were tot.be found in terminology
devised to protect states*

1S u p r a , pp •*...62-63

Cspelled S-O-U-T-H-E-P-N} rights*
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In essence, th© Constitution end resulting government; were
£.i
said to have been constructed toy th© individual states joining
together and forming a compact*

Should th© majority of th©

state© succeed in passing a law harmful to an individual
state, that state could declare the law null within Its
boundaries*

Should this tactic fall, the state could re

gard the compact as broken and separate from th© nation it
had previously joined.

After all, the South would ©ay, is

the method not the seme a© was used by the revered Founding
Father© when they broke with the Crown?

To the South, then,

the ^Compact Theory” was based on the most solid of ideologi
cal foundation©.:
Regarding th© issue of slavery. Southerners found
justification for their ^peculiar institution” by claiming to
feed, clothe, and shelter their sieves while th© Northern
factory worker© received starvation wages.

Further, the slave

owners provided the blacks with knowledge of Christianity
which they otherwise would not have gained.

The Southerner©

claimed to be living the ideal© of democracy end freedom.
Northern agitators were viewed as trouble makers who did not
understand the true Southern life style nor the factual
meaning of the Constitution.
The North*a power had grown and the South, with or
without Ideology, could no longer dictate its will.

On the

other hand, the North was not strong enough to force its own
will upon the South.

A middle ground was agreed upon to

protect the Southern interest© and the Compromise of 1850 was
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©FFeoted,

In retrospect, th© tactic© of compromise ware

merely delaying in nature, For the North wa© destined to gain
control of th© American oligarchy.

A© time pas©edf even

though Congress was in the increasing grasp of th© North, the
South Felt Its position to be secure as long as a man with
a viewpoint not anti-Southern in nature was President.
With the election oF antislavery proponent Abraham Lincoln
to the oFFice oF ChieF Executive, however, the threat to the
Southern oligarchy reached its apex.

The ability oF the

South to have a, dominant voice in th© eFFairs of the nation
was gone.

The oligarchy recognized the loss and also believed

their position as dominant power holder© within the South
itself could be put in Jeopardy by Lincoln.®

They Felt a

threat, and th© resulting Fear caused them to react by
leaving the Union,

For the Southern oligarchs,

it was pre-

Ferable to f,reign in hell than serve in heaven.”®
Within lB61*s atmosphere oF secession, delegate©
representing the oligarch© oF th© various states met in
Montgomery, Alabama, to construct a new government,
JeFFerson Davis, appointed by the gathering oF power holder©
to head the oligarchy as President oF th© ConFederacy, would
take actions in the next Four years having Far-reaching

®See Rcmbort w« Patrick, JeFFergon Davie and Hi© Cabinet
CBaton Rougej
Louisiana State University Press, 1944j, pp.
l-SB and.Carleton Seal©, War within a War CPhiladelphiai
Chilton Books, 19SS3 *
3Sugra, P* 65,
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consequences For the South*

To understand those action©, m

glimpse of Davis, the man, is necessary.

Then the fears

operating or not operating upon him can be axmniftad-and
explained*
Jefferson Davis was born in 1808 to a family far
from aristocratic in background.

Still, the desire to

achieve high status was- evident in Davis* father.

For the

elder Oavis, statu© could only be achieved with education.
In his last letter to hi® ©on he wrote t

"Remember the short

lessons o f instruction offered you before our parting.

Use

©very possible means to acquire useful knowledge as knowledge
is power * . .

The youth did not initially enjoy the

struggle to learn and.related how his father told him,®
*0f course, it is for you to elect whether you
will work with heed or handsf my son could not be ©n
Idler.
I want more cotton-pickers and will give you
work.*
The next day, furnished with a bag, I went into
th© fields and worked ell day and the day after. The
heat of the sun and th© physical labor, in conjunction
with the implied equality with the other cottonpickers, convinced me that school was the lesser evil.
It was Jefferson*® older brother Joseph, however, who
was to exert the greatest influence upon Oavis.

Joseph was

regarded a© th© richest man in Mississippi and was able toprocure an appointment to West Point for his young brother.
Upon graduating, Davis served a short and fairly impressionable

4
Jefferson Davis, .Private Letters, ad. by Hudson Strode
CNew Yorks ■Harcourt, ©race"'^'"’
'SorI'd, 'Inc,, 1966} , pp. 6-7.
^Varina Oavis, Jefferson Davis, 1 CNew Yorks
Company, Publishers, 189(1}j, p p . 17-18.

Belford

term in the army.

Obviously * HOavis loved routinej

definite

organization, obedience, deference to superior©, authority,
gradation in position . . . .

Army life stimulated these

tendencies and really caked the man* s mind into fixed habits."
He later married and resigned From the military to
live the life of a planter near hie ambitious brother.
ly, however, his wife died*

Short

Oavis proceeded to withdraw

himself from much of th© surrounding world by working
all day and reading all night*

With hie brother, he dis

cussed th© newspaper© and political journal© of the day.
Oavis was successful as a planter and he came to nurture
within himself John C • Calhoun and hi© fellow Southern
oligarchs* view of the political world.

That the ideology

thus developed justified the Southerners* status was naturaii
ly not put forth e© a reason for its being the explanation of
TRUTH.

When Jefferson Oavis met the girl who would become his

second wife, hi© manner of grasping what he believed to be
the absolute forced her to write, "He impresses me a© a re
markable type of man, but of uncertain temper, and has a way
of taking for granted that everybody agree© with him when he
expresses an opinion . . .

As she wrote year© later, "he

sincerely thought all he ©aid, and, moreover, could not under
stand any other man coming to a different conclusion after

^Bufeton J* Hendrick,
Statesman of the Lost Cause
CNew York? The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1939), p. 20.
V. C&vis, Jefferson Oavis, p. 191,

c
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his premises were stated*" 8

The tendency of Oavis to appear

to be an ideologue was reflected years later when talking with
sometimes opponent William Seward*

Seward told Oavis many of

his [Seward* s} antislavery speeches were done for political
purpose©*"-to get support in the North.
never speak from conviction?**

Seward

astonished Oavis retorted, "As God is
©peak from any other motive.**

Oavis asked, **Do you
replied, "Me-ver."
my judge,

The

I never

q

Beside© the drive© of status, knowledge and ideology,
Oavis desired military glory.

With his West Point experience©

and planter1© influence, he eagerly seized the chance to lead
a Mississippi regiment in the Mexican
sister*

War.

He wrote hi©

**If occasion offer© it may be that I will return

with a reputation over which you will rejoice as my Mother
would have done.***0

Oavis did achieve his reputation when he

personally played a large role in defeating the Mexicans in
battle.
But

He cam© to consider himself a brilliant tactician*

hen th© President offered to promote him to general,

□avis refused, saying the Constitution provided for such ap
pointments to be done by the states, not the federal
government.

8 Ibld*, p* 199.
%/illiam Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter
[New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963j, p. 168.
• Oavis, Private Letters, p. 40.
V. Oavis, Jefferson Oavis, p. 360*
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After the war, th© hero, because of the high status in
the oligarchy of both hi© brother and himself, won appoint
ment as Senator with th© same ease which, beFore th© war, h©
had been elected a Representative with little opposition*
In the Senate he served well and his reputation and his power
increased*

Under Franklin Fierce he was an able Secretary oF

War, reenforcing his belleF© in hie own military g e n i u s . ^
Later Oavis returned to the Senate where he oFten championed
the Southern ideology and ©trove to protect both th© oligarchy
as it was then constituted and the oligarchy*s Foundation oF
IS
slavery#
JeFFerson Oavis was th© man chosen to head the new
Confederate government*

Encouraged to seek status and position,

he accepted an ideology to explain the world in term© justi
fying end protecting his existence*

Arrogant as to his

superiority as a man and a militarist, he we© chosen to use
1A
his talent© to preserve power For the Southern oligarchy.A
Preservation oF position For the oligarchy and For
himselF were to be the guides by which JeFFerson Oevi© led
hi© nation*

Being recognized as e military expert and a© a

member of the higher reaches oF the oligarchy, Oavis

A JeFFerson Oavis, The Rise and Fall oF the Confederate
Government, I CNew Yorks
0. Appleton and Company, 1881}, pp.
23-24.
13
For instance, see the resolution© he presented to
the Senate, February 2, 1860, in J* Oavis, Rise and Fall, I,
pp. 42-43*
14 Mary Boykin Chestnut, A Diary From Dixie CBoston{
Houghton Mifflin Company, 19493, p. S.
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never felts the fear for personal acceptance.*®

There was

no new peer group within the emerging government he had to
please*

Never having had to struggle and campaign to be

elected to any of the positions he held in his life* Oavis
was not apprehensive for popular support*

Since Oavis

\

refused to lower himself to do manual labor, he looked down
upon those who made a living with their hands, and Davis thus
did not fear for their esteem.*6

Believing knowledge to

be the key to power, he dismissed as ignorant both those
he held to be below hie status and those who lodged threats
against him*

"The public * * * have no correct measure

for military operations* and the journals ere very reckless
In their statement©."*7

"Success is the test of merit, and

yet there has been nothing which I have found to require a
greater effort of patience than to bear the criticism© of
th© ignorant, who pronounce everything a failure which does
not equal their expectation© or desires, and can see no good
result which is not in the line of their own imagining©,"*®
The new President indicated much of the path he would
follow in the coming years in his inaugural address as head

*®Sugra, pp. S9**71.
*sSupra, p. 72.
*7J> Oavis, Pise and Fall, IX* p. 41.
*®J. Oavis, Private betters, p. 132*
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of the provisional government.

Knowing there were threats

to the Southern oligarchy, Oavis looked to the area where
he felt s e c u r e s t © the knowledge he had ecoumuiat©d--and
turned it against

the threat©.

gain support For the oligarchs*
masses behind the ConFederacy•

First h© used ideology to
position by rallying th©
flQur political position

• • • illustrates

the American

idea that governments rest

on th© consent of

th© governed*

and that it is the right

of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they
become destructive oF the ends For which they were established
"The Constitution framed by our Father© is that of these
Confederate States.

In their exposition of it, and in the

Judicial construction it has received, we have a light which
/

.reveals its true meaning.”®*
To retain hi® new Found dominance, Oavis couched his
desire For power in terms of the people.

” IF I mistake not

th© judgment of the people, a reunion with th© State© From
which we have separated is neither practicable nor desir
able.

Supra, pp. 62-63.
James P. Richardson, ©d.# The Messages and Papers of
JeFFerson 'Oavis and the ConFederacy, I TF3©“ YorteT™Chelsea House
— Robert Hector Publi©her©, 19663, p • 32.
®*Ibid.t p « 36#
S®Ibid., p. 35.
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To meet the threat; From the North and protect the
oligarchfB position, Oavis turned to his military background
and ignored much of hie states’ right© doctrine by centralizing the armed force©*

”For purpose© of defense, the Con

federate State© may, under ordinary circumstances, rely
mainly upon the militisf but it i© advisable,

in the present

condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed
and disciplined army.

...

1 also suggest that • • • a

navy * ,* . will be rac|uir©d*,,®^
A year later. In his inaugural address as President
of the Confederacy, Oavis applied the tactic of maligning
those who desired to topple the Southern oligarchy
Fellow-citizens, after the struggle of ages had
consecrated the right of the Englishman to Constitution
al representative government, our colonial ancestors
were forced to vindicate that birthright by an appeal
to arms*
Success crowned their efforts, and they
provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against
future aggression.
The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most
odious and least responsible form of despotism, has
denied us both the right and the remedy*
Nhen Oavis made his cabinet selections, he reflected
the need to gain support for his position*

There were

individuals who also had desired to head the oligarchy and
Oavis had to soothe their injured pride*

Oavis had to satisfy

the wants of ©till others who could possibly become opponent©

S3Ibid., p. 34.
•^Richardson, Messages and Papers, p. 188.
supra, pp* 65-SB*
——
■■

See slso,
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to keep them from turning against him*

He, therefore, picked

each member of his cabinet by giving representation to the
different geographical regions of the South*

He decided no

two cabinet posts were to be manned by individuals from th©
same state and aliowed the individual states delegations
meeting in Montgomery to select one of their members to
represent their © t a t © *25
As the Confederacy was constituted on principles cf
decentralization, Davis had few demand® to perform domestic
services.

He called for a national army to meet the biggest

problem he had to face— the threat posed by the Northern
armies*

Ha saw the threat and was fearful.
pc
Chestnut recorded, one evening

A© Mrs*

the President walked with me slowly up and down that
long room, and our conversation was of the saddest*
Nobody knows so well as he doe© the difficulties
which beset this hard-driven Confederacy*
As he
talks of things a© they are now, in a melancholy
cadence * * * •'
To relieve hi© r.ixiety, Oavis looked to Europe for
aid.

He felt the implied threat of withholding cotton— King

Cotton— a© a result of the impending hostilities from
Europe*s textile industry, would force the continent to
rally to the side of the South.

For years before th© war,

the theory persisted In the South of Europe*© inability to

25 V* Davis,
Supra, pp. S9*»60.
25chestnut,

JefPerson Davis, II, p • 37.
— — — *
Qlary, p. 352.

See also,
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survive without American cotton,®^
o f

Davis9 own acceptance

th© belief was reflected in ©n 18SX message to the

Confederate Congress,

gg

The theory of King Cotton was so

accepted by the man that he initially viewed European support
a© a foregone conclusion#

While Oavis found comfort from

fear© of the North in the belief of impending European
©id, h© did recognise other threat© already on the rise
within th© oligarchy itself.

Among the oligarch© were a

group of'radicals who could easily ©pply pressure on Oavis
and thus be a threat to his position#

Oavis ©elected one of

the most vociferous of their number, William Lowndes Yancey,
to represent the Confederacy in Europe,

Yancey was a fiery

leader-and Davis, being fearful of Yancey9© presence in
hi© midst,: as well as being certain of forthcoming European
recognition and support* felt safe in sending the man who
desired to reopen the slave trade to represent.the South
on th© continent where such thoughts were received with
anathema*

Oavis9 act can only be interpreted as being done

under the belief that Yancey would not be able to influence
the course of events#

Mora importantly, the appointment

removed from the Confederacy and Davis9 mind a possible threat
to his personal position*

*^Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy {Chicago*
The University of Chicago free©,. 1931), pp. 1-24#
^Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp. 148-143.
^Ow s l e y ,

King Cotton, pp. 58-53#
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As time passed and European inter vents ion failed to
materialize! Davis began to grow increasingly worried*

Know*

ing European aid was necessary to preserve the Southern
oligarchy, he began to apply some pressure on the continent*
While being cognizant of the Fact that too much pressure
might force Europe to turn instead to the federal government,
Oavi© urged Congress to debate the necessity of a cotton
embargo to strike fear rather than animosity into Europe and
obtain support without actually instituting an embargo*®®
The President, not necessarily fearing for personal acceptance,
did fear the Confederacy itself would not be recognized as
an equal in the Family of nations*
The fear of not gaining favorable European interven*'
tion caused Davis, also, to forbid any invasions of the
North during the war's first year.

He desired the Confederacy

to appear to the world as the attacked rather than the
attacker*

H.J* Eckenrod© feel© the policy may have had the

actual result of costing the South the war*
Qavi© truly ©aw the need for European aid*

A© the

Confederacy fell appart, Davis became increasingly
vitrolie and attacked the European powers* failure to

3 0 Ibid*,

pp. 31*32 and Wilfred S. Yearns, The Con*
federate Congress £Athens, Georgia: The University of
Georgia 'fress, 19503, p* 155.
^ H . J . Eckenrod©, deffereon Day let Free 1dent of the
South [New York: The Macmillan Company, 19303, ppT~l54~T5i»
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respond**^

The bitterness lingered after the war when he

wrote of Britain, **how detrimental to us, and advantageous
to our enemy, was the manner in which the leading European
power observed its hollow profession of neutrality toward
the beliig©r©nte .H 3 3
War was present; Davis recognized it and was afraid*
He turned to the familiar for help*

Being a former army man,

he did not interfere with the operations of the navy*

Having

previously held the office, he did operate, in effect, a©
hi® own Secretary of War.

Rather than centralizing ell of

the troops to meet firmly/ any advance, Oavi© divided them
throughout the Confederacy*

Besides preventing any one

general from procuring enough power to b© a threat to him, ^
it also was in the best interest of his personal position
to decentralize the troops ■for another reason*

Since the

war was supposedly being fought by the Southerner® to defend
themselves from aggression, local politician© pressed for
troops to protect their individual states; end Devis
acceded to their request in order to retain their support *3 3

go

Richardson, Message® and Papers, p p • 444-44S, 48S-487.

3 3 J*

Davis, Rise and Pall, II, p* 382.

3 4 Eckenrode,
3 3 H©rdriek,

President, p. 163*

Statesmen, pp. 347-349 and'Frank E •
Vandiver, Rebel Brass [Baton Rouges Louisiana State University
Press, 1956}, p. 16*

m

Still, Davie was basically able to direct all opera*
tion© against the North#
Run,

Before the first battle of Bull

it was Oavi© who chose to consolidate the armies of

F.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph £* Johnston to meet the advanc
ing- union forces.

A® Davis said, ”Th© great question of

uniting the two armies had been decided at Richmond.”3®
Following the battle, Davis pressed his generals to pursue
the fleeing enemy .3 7

In this end other instances, Oavi©

directed what little grand strategy the South chose’ to
exercise.

He selected and removed generals, shifted force©,

and approved plans#
much as possible*

He tried to direct the war effort a®
As happen© in all wars, meet moves are made

to counter the threats of the enemy.

The fear for defeat

of his position, pressed long and hard upon Davis; so much
so, h© confided to his wife,. ”h© felt he would give all
his limb® to have someone with whom he could share it.”®®
However, he never did choose to truly ©hare it, for his
position meant too much to him#
Devi®,

indeed, wa© not above recognising proven

ability in others end he also realized the magnitude of
the struggle would force him to allow other© some latitude
to make move© on their own#

Robert E . Lee’s military

Davis, Rise end Fall, 1, p. 347*
37

Ibid., pp. 353*336#

3 3 V.

Oavis, Jefferson Davis, XI, p. 301*
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genius was hailed throughout: the Soutsh and Oavis certainly
recognised it*

Lee was the standard by which all other

commander© were measured#

Though Davis ©aw Lee*© abilities

a© great#, the President did not rank them above hi© own.
Oavis# in hi© own mind# was commander-in-chief because
no one in the South knew more ©bout military matter© than h©
did.

His belief in his own supremacy never faltered and

though stating-*-n If I could take one wing and Lee the other#
I think we could between u© wrest e victory From those
people#”

— he never chose to step down From his high oFFice

to lead the troops in battle#
Jefferson Oavi© was accepted a© President by almost
everyone in the South.

However#

in directing the war

effort, Oavis did not always meet the approval of hi©
generals#

His most difficult moment© war© with Joseph

Johnston*

Humors claimed that Johnston and Oavis, when both

were at Hast Point together, had a rivalry over an inn
keeper*© daughter.

During this episode# Johnston supposedly

proved himself superior*

If the rumor is true, it explain©

many of □avis* actions as regards Johnston*

in term© of a

reaction to fear, Johnston would never accept him as an
equal *

39

Ibid., p* 392.

^Hendrick, Statesmen* p# 13.
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Certainly, though, the various altercations between
the two can be viewed as the result of the fear For position#
Following Bull Bun, rwroors were prevalent of Oavis preventing
pursuit of the routed enemy when in actuality he had urged
the Confederate commanders to press their advantage#'

Inter

preting the rumors a© threats to his position, Davis wrote
Johnston asking him to make open knowledge of what had
actually occurred#

Johnston*© response, while laying the

blame of failure to proceed upon the presence of fresh Union
troops, failed to make any mention of the fact Davis had urged
pursuit#

Johnston*© letter we© not looked upon as satisfactory

by Oavis, and it was instead viewed a© a threat to the '•
President*© position#4 *
Whan the President presented s list of name© to the
Congress for appointment as full general, Johnston, while
on the list, did not head it, in a possible reaction against
the general*© threatening posture.

Johnston was indignant

and wrote of his distress to Davis who replied concerning
the letter, ” Its language is, as you say, unusualf it© argu
ments and statement© utterly one-sided, and its insinuationsa© unfounded a© they are unbecoming.” ^

Johnston*© letter

may Hava been the result of his own reaction to what he

4

*J# Davis, Rise and Fall, I, pp. 362-384.
v

Davis, Jefferson Davis, II, pp. 144-163.
Chestnut, Diary, p.

-zrrn- - - - —

See also

.
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felt was a threat to his own position,

Oavis* answer

certainly was related to His fear for his high office, as
Johnston*s letter was interpreted as an open statement of
Oavis not acting properly In a military matter.
there were problems.

Continually

Oavis disliked Johnston and it took

great encouragement by others and the greater threat to the
position of the Confederacy to persuade the President to
allow Jo femeton to command future armies.
Joseph Johnston was a capable, though unaggressive,
general.

As feelings mounted against Johnston*© continual

failure to fight, Oavis, to protect his own position,
replaced him with John

8

* Hood*

The switch in commanders

was don© "under popular and political pressure brought by
Bov. Brown and Sen. Hill of Be.,

[sic.3 who claimed that

Johnston intended to surrender Atlanta without giving
40

battle .11

To prove the soundness of hi© judgment and

thereby hi© right to govern, Oavis often had supported his
generals, but he was quick to depose the man who was often
a threat to his position.
Threats to the Chief Executive*© status as commander**
in-chief also emanated from Congress.

In March, 1868, a bill

was passed to provide for a general independent of the
President to direct the Confederacy*s armies.

CBloomington,
575.

Oavi© responded

Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962J , p .
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by vetoing the bill*

In ©n effort; to keep Congressional

dissatisfaction to a minimum, Oavis w r o t e : ^
As it cannot have been the intention of Congress to
create the office of a general not bound to obey
orders of the Chief Magistrate, and as this seem©
to be the effect of the act, I can but anticipate
the concurrence of the Congress in my opinion that
it should not become law.
A© one of hisccontemporaries stated, ,fM r . Oavis manifested
an extreme jealousy of any encroachment upon his preroga**
tive by Congress • . . *"
The internal status quo of the oligarchy was retained
for the next few years*
badly*

However, the Confederacy was losing

The position of the entire oligarchy was in danger

and inrresponse to the threat some of the oligarchs began
to look for a new leader*

Their eyes turned quite naturally

toward the individual whose successes had inspired the
South--Ptobert £• Lee•

Pressure began to rise within, as

well as upon, the Confederate Congress to make Lee dictator*
Davis opposed the move in an effort to continue as head of
the oligarchy*

While his power was great enough to slow

down Congressional action, the mounting cries for Lee were
of such magnitude as to force some accedence*

The Congress

men also were worried about their own position*s support and
the threat© to their position by the North.
men, too, were seekers who wanted to cripple,

Some Congress
if not destroy,

44 Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp* 215-216.
^°Charles Maurice, An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, ed* by Sir
Frederick Maurice (Boston
Little, Brown, end Company, 1927},
*

Oavis* power.

The pressure© for Congress to act were too

strong for even Oavis to completely stem as he attempted to
hold on to his position*

Still, Oavis had enough power to

somewhat- turn the tide of discontent within Congress.

The

two branches of government both acting from fear for position,
reached © compromisel and Lee was made supreme commander ©f
the Confederate a r m i e s ^ rather than dictator.

The compromise

allowed Oavi© to remain as President, although ”the passage
in both houses of the measure for making General Lee general**
in—chief by large majorities is very distasteful to the
President*”^

Most would think Davis relinquished* some- df

his prerogative© in order to retain the rest of his position*
However, Wilfred B. Yearns point© out, ’’Davis had no -qualm* ,
about being able to handle Lee.”

40

four years of war

had shown Oavis that Las would refer to him before any move©
were made*

Unlike Johnston, Lee would accede to, and ba

respectful of, the President.

In actuality, according to

Yearn©, though appearing to relinquish power, Oavi© still

^ J a m e s Longstreet, from Manassas to Appomattox
(Bloomington* Indiana s Indiana University Pros©, 19603,
pp * 583—584*
47

Robert. Gar lick Hill Kean, Inside the Confederate.
Government, ©d. by Edward Younger CNew Yorks
Oxford University
Press, 1957}, p. 190.
^ Y earns, The Penfederate Congress, p. 227.
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retained it.49

If the author is correct* Oavis* friends

were not completely correct in saying "he is honest, pure,
patriotic! but no administrator— the worst judge of men in
the world • « .
Entering the conflict with the belief the entire
populace would rally behind the*!** the oligarchy initially
made no provisions for farced conscription#

However*

it

was the oligarchy which broke with the union for its own
preservation and not the populace which resulted in a
shortage of men entering the ranks.

Oavis again couched hi©

true need,in this case men to save the oligarchy*© position,
in ideology*

On March 18* 1882, he wrote

The vest preparations mad© toy the enemy for a
combined assault at numerous points on our frontier
and seacoast have produced the result that might
have been expected* .They have animated the people
with_a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute,
and so self-sacrificing that it requires rather to
be regulated than to be stimulated.
The men were so well stimulated Davis then ©aids

nI

therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all
persons residing in the Confederate States, between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five • . . shall be held in the
military service • . * *"

49Supra« p* 66.
" K e a n , Inside Government, p. 72*

■

Richardson, Messa gee and Papers, p* 206•

Men over* thirty-five with their "natural experience are
needed for maintaining order and good government at home
and in supervising preparations for rendering efficient

armies in the field.”

Five month® later, threat® to the

Confederacy1© position increased! and though trying to shift
the onus elsewhere, men over thirty-five were now seen as
well qualified for the army,

"The very large increase of

forces recently called into the field by the President of
the United States may render it necessary hereafter to extend
the provisions of the conscription law so as to embrace
person© between the age© of thirty-five and forty-five
years,”"
The oligarch© were men of power whose support was
needed by Davis, and exemption from the draft was provided
for those who owned twenty or more slave©*

The resulting

public outcries forced Oavi© to call for.repealing the act
to avoid mas© desertion . 3 3
Another bill was passed by the Congress which was
designed. In essence, to draft native© of Maryland residing
in Richmond Into the army.

But In order to avoid turning

neutral Maryland into a threat, Oavis killed the bill with
the use of the pocket veto *9 4

"ib i d . , p. 238,
earns, The Confederate Congress, p. 79.
54

Ibid.. p. 76.

IQS

Here men were still needed to preserve the Southern
oligarchy*

The government tried unsuccessfully to prevent

raising popular animosity toward the government by refusing
to. conscript slaves.

Finally* however, Oavis was con

quered sufficiently by his fear for position on November ? f
1864, to form a policy calling for the placement of slave©
in the army,®®

Oavis fought with the Senate for passage

of the bill saying, "If the Confederacy falls, there should
be written on its tombstone,

*Qied of a theory,M*®®

Jefferson Davie reached the point where his Ideology
would be better dead if it assured the life of hie position.
The ©elf of Davis was only whole when he held the position
of. power..

His ideology was adopted to fit his positlonj he

did not seek position to further his ideology.

Ideology, Oavis

discovered, is a nicety to have only when one*© position is
©©cure*

For example, November 18, 1861, found Oavis in a

rather solid position and he was willing to state ideological
beliefs*

Using designed to protect position,

ideology was

used to damn Lincoln for suspending■the. writ of habeas
corpus "bo sacred to freemen * " ® 7

Three short months later,

unrest in certain areas o f the South forced Oavis to suspend

®®Pichardsom, Messages and Papers, pp. 493«-496.
®®<J* Oavis, flee and fall, X, p. 518*
®7 Pichard©omt Hessegee and Papers, p. 138.
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ga
*the writ: Himself#
The Southern ideology of states* right:© did not coin
cide with the need to fight a total war#

Oavis, as the war

progressed, came to attempt increased centralization of the
war-directing apparatus.

However,

in various sections of the

Confederacy could be found those who preferred to "reign in
hell than serve in heaven,”

Governors Zeb Vance of North

Carolina and Joe Brown of Georgia in particular put obstacles
in Oavis* path which he could never completely bypass.

As

frank E . Vandiver stated, "The South may have been wrecked
by decentralized centralization#"®®

Oavis* position could

only be saved by centralization so he ©crapped hi© ideology*
Vanoe and Brown*s positions were protected by their Southern
ideology, allowing them to retain the doctrine of states*
rights.
To the end, the President sought to keep possession
of his position.

Basil Duke was with Davis in the final

days of the Confederacy.

Duke told the President all was

lost and Duke had a responsibility to prevent the further
bloodshed of his men.

Oavis tried to sway Ouke and his men

and force them to change their minds.

"Even," he said,

"if the troops now with me be all that I can for the present
rely on, three thousand brave men are enough for a nucleus
around which the whole people will rally whon the panic

50

Ibid., p. £19•

J J*Q

Vandiver, Rebel Brass, p. 126*

108

which now afflicts-© them ha© passed away.”

Duke state©,®®

He appealed eloquently iso ©very sentiment and
reminiscence tshats mights be supposed tso move a
Soutshern soldier . . . . For some minutes not; a
word was spoken*
Then Mr. oavi© rose and ejaculated
bitterly that all
was indeed lost. He had become
very pallid . . . .
Duke further state© he believed 0avis desired to be captured
after realising the struggle was completed.
Oavi© was willing to give himself to his enemy*
His ©elf was only made whole when he held dominant power.
After his position was taken
truly alive.
seeker*■

Davie held

from him, he was no longer

all of the qualities of e power

he we© confident, egocentric end self-righteous*

Once in power, his public policies ^ © r e geared to- retaining
his position.

Hi© choice of cabinet members, search for

European aid, and management of the war reflect the presence
of the fear for position*

Possibly ©am© of hie motivation©

in the diplomatic field were the result of the fear for
acceptance.

If the Confederacy was recognised as m nation*

state by the European government©, then Oavi© would in turn
be truly recognized as the equal of any of the other heads
of government in the world*
acceptance.

Oavi© never achieved this

Moreover, his position of dominant power holder

in the South was destroyed#

He became "pallid,” and he was,

in essence, no longer the real Jefferson Davis#

He was once

6 0 8 asil W. Duke, "Last Days of the Confederacy,” in
Settles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed* by Robert Johnson
e n d 'Clarence Suel, IV Chew York* The Century Co*, 18873,
p p , 762—766.
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again a parson who could turn to ideology.

He defended his

actions a© President in his apologia, The Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government, by saying.

C 1

The Southern States had rightfully the power to with
draw from a Union into which they had, as sovereign
communities, voluntarily entered; that the denial of
that right was a violation of the letter and spirit
of the compact between the States; and that the
war waged by the Federal Government against the
seceding States was in disregard of the limitations
of the Constitution, end destructive of the principles
of the Declaration of Independence.

SI
J * Oavis, Rise and Fall, I, p. v .

SUMMARY

A© man evolved, ©a did hi© need For a leader and hi©
ability to Fear*

A leader protected and fed him, while

fear gave him the ability to be cognizant of threats to his
survival.

Man. ha© thus allowed, or been forced, to accept

ruler© to be situated above him.
cannot escape their own humanness*

However, those ruler©
They, too, must obey

their own inborn and experiential characteristics.
also fear, and out of their fear, react.

They

Because of their

situation, the rulers* reactions have the physical and moral
force of the; nation-state behind them, and their reactions
become translated into public policy.
Man*© survival has ceme to mean more than simply a
breathing existence.

He had developed certain psychological

needs and until they are satisfied hi© mental self will not
have been actualized.

And until hie mental self is made

whole, he doe© not have a life worth preserving.

for the

ruler to actualize hi© own self, he must be in possession of
the mysterious intangible substance known a© power— a
substance which allows him to reign over others.
After examining the phenomena, a greet contradiction
seem© to appear in those who are called power holders.

These

men often spend many years desperately desiring and clawing

Ill

for the golden ring of power— for the glittering substancewhich will insure a whole self— end fearing it will never be
attained.

Yet, once the power is actually acquired,

it is

found to be more of an addictive curse, rather than an
end to an unquenchable thirst.

The self-righteous, confident,

egocentric power seeker find® that the acquisition of the
golden ring is in reality obtalnment of a new and unsteadying fear.

The fear he feels of losing his preferred status

is greater than- was his fear of never being able to attain
the position.
hi© anxiety.

In response, the power holder acts €o calm
Public policies which may have great effect

upon the common eit 1 seen are a result of the fear of losing
power.

The more intensely the fear i® felt, the more

obvious is the evidence of anxiety being the prime motivation
of public policy.

The fear of losing power, which can be

come ell consuming, is a basic, if not absolute, explanation
for public policies.

In essence, man does not wield power

as much as power wields man.
After gaining the golden ring, the self-righteous,
confident, and egocentric power seeker discovers he loses*
to an ever-fluctuating degree, the element termed confidence.
He does, however, retain the egoeentricity which saturates
him with the fear for his survival.

He fears for his life.

But because he cannot be whole without power, he fears for
the elements which for him are embodied in power.

He is

anxious for his position, acceptance, esteem, legacy,

lie

creation, power, charisma, and ideology*
Fear For life is the most; basic of all anxieties•
Though rarely reflected directly in policies,
had an indirect affect upon a leader’s action*

it ha© often
The evidence

is seen in the elaborate measures taken by Nkrumeh to guard
his own security*

The result of the Fear for life is an

isolation from the governed and a reliance upon e few close,
but seldom completely trusted, intimates*
Apprehension© of losing the position of power which
was captured only after long and herd struggle comprises the
fear for position.

Actions ere taken to insure the main

tenance of the seat of power for the oligarch*

Neti end

Soviet use of violence to eliminate threat© to their statu©
reflect the extremes to which the reaction to the fear has
gone.
The desire to be accepted e© an equal partner In the
oligarch occasions much anxiety within the power holder*
The fear for acceptance is often released in policies bear**
ing the stamp of what the power holder sense© i© expected of
him from the rest of the oligarchy.
Many of Lincoln’© humanitarian acts were the direct
result of hi© fear for esteem.

The need to be loved and

honored by the wide populace of a nation often ha© been the
basis of public policies*.
For many possessor© of power, the apprehensions they
have concerning the future ©re often as greet, if not greater,

1X3

than their concern for their present status*

For a Lyndon

Johnson, who is primarily concerned about how posterity
will remember and judge him, the fear for legacy is the
prime motivation of many of his actions*

In his ©yes, a

tomorrow which may not ©van include his physical self is
more important than the power he grasps today *
When Tito mad© move© to rid Yugoslavia of Groat
separatists, he mirrored a reaction to the fear for creation.
Tomorrow, for such a power holder, is not to be found in
the pages of history 3 but In the organism called the nation
state*

As long as it lives a© he created or shaped it,

the Individual lives; therefore, the power holder will
execute moves to insure it will survive after he passes
from the scene *
The fear for power result© in the initiation of public
policies when the oligarch is in danger of having hi© office
lose the prerogative© which it once held.

The power holder

who display© the tendency of acting when power, not solely
office,

1©

threatened doe© so without desiring to join the

oligarchy ©imply to gain status a© a member of the ruling
class*

He desires, instead, to be classified a© © power

wielder, not merely a power holder*
If a man possesses charisma and has attained hi®
goal of capturing power largely a® a result of the gift, he
will strive to retain hi© charisma.

He know© if h® should

lose the gift, the fear for position will become m more

1X4

prominent; anxiety.

The Fear often Forces the charismatic

individual to remain secluded, to erect larger than life
statue© oF himself, and to broach no criticism of his
moves#

For others, however, the Fear For charisma is

actually greater than any apprehension they have concerning
a Future Fear For position#

The impulse causes a 0© Gaulle

to sacrifice position and not return to the public political
arena if, in striving to return, a danger to charisma could
result#
Being extremely egocentric end necessarily pragmatic,
a man who is successful in hi© quest For power usually Find©
little time or inclination to look beyond himself#

Yet,

one could argue of there having been power possessor© who
are strongly imbued with an ideology#

For them, the Fear For

ideology is the ruling motivation of their lives#

These

men wish to gain power to Further their beliefs, not them**
©elves#

Once in possession of power, they will gear their

actions to preserve the potency of their beliefs rather
than their selves.

The fear For ideology can be as ©11

encompassing ©s any other Fear as evidenced in the Norwegian
Far Barter1© willingness to sacrifice hi© position rather
than hi© belief#

Nor© often, however, the power holder will

scrap his ideology, as Jefferson Oavis did, if his position
is jeopardized by his adherence to ideology#
To be sure, evidence can be Found of other Fear©
dwelling on the mind© of power holders#

Even more obvious
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is the fact leader© ora afflicted with a combination of these
anxieties*

Each fear modifies the others and Fights with

them for supremacy within the oligarch#

To calm them, the

power holder act©, often with public policies*
Those who seek to grasp the golden ring of power
believe it will cure an ever-present, ever-©xcrut 1 sting
ache that dominates their hearts and souls*

They do not

know under a coating of glitter lies a deeper, darker core
of fear*
Once in the holder*© possession, the ring, of power,
while retaining its glitter, unleashes th© fears it bears#
8y

bringing new fears to the oligarch, power becomes, not

a tool used by man, as much as it is a force in and by
itself.
All men act from fear#

The ..power holder stand® ©part

from others in the force which can be exerted in the reactions
of his fear®.
In viewing the action© of those power holders [from what
has been said, it would seem that the term power holder Is
actually a distortion) It would appear they could often be
charged with employing fear tactics upon the populace*

Yet,

in reality these individuals do not use fear to the extent
they are, in turn, gripped by it.

It is merely the power

holder*s fear which cause© him to act*

Public policy, then,

is the result of a power holder*© reaction to fear*
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